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ARTIFICIAL FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
WILLIAM MAGNUSON*
Recent advances in the field of artificial intelligence have revived long-
standing debates about the interaction between humans and technology. These
debates have tended to center around the ability of computers to exceed the
capacities and understandings of human decisionmakers, and the resulting ef-
fects on the future of labor, inequality, and society more generally. These ques-
tions have found particular resonance in finance, where computers already play
a dominant role. High-frequency traders, quantitative (or "quant") hedge funds,
and robo-advisors all represent, to a greater or lesser degree, real-world instan-
tiations of the impact that artificial intelligence is having on the field. This Arti-
cle, however, takes a somewhat contrarian position. It argues that the primary
danger of artificial intelligence in finance is not so much that it will surpass
human intelligence, but rather that it will exacerbate human error. It will do so
in three ways. First, because current artificial intelligence techniques rely heav-
ily on identifying patterns in historical data, use of these techniques will tend to
lead to results that perpetuate the status quo (a status quo that exhibits all the
features and failings of the external market). Second, because some of the most
"accurate" artificial intelligence strategies are the least transparent or explain-
able ones, decisionmakers may well give more weight to the results of these
algorithms than they are due. Finally, because much of the financial industry
depends not just on predicting what will happen in the world, but also on pre-
dicting what other people will predict will happen in the world, it is likely that
small errors in applying artificial intelligence (either in data, programming, or
execution) will have outsized effects on markets. This is not to say that artificial
intelligence has no place in the financial industry, or even that it is bad for the
industry. It clearly is here to stay, and, what is more, has much to offer in terms
of efficiency, speed, and cost. But as governments and regulators begin to take
stock of the technology, it is worthwhile to consider artificial intelligence's real-
world limitations.
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INTRODUCTION
In the novel Tell the Machine Goodnight, a super-powered computer
called the Apricity (named after the now-defunct English word for "the feel-
ing of sun on one's skin in the winter") uses advanced artificial intelligence
to deliver lifestyle recommendations to users.' A simple cotton swab applied
to the mouth, and then swiped across the computer's reader, is all the com-
puter needs to formulate a list of recommended changes for users to make in
their lives. These changes, if implemented, promise to lead to happier, more
fulfilled lives, or, as Apricity's corporate legal department advises them to
say, to improvements in one's "overall life satisfaction." The story opens
with one unfortunate user receiving his own personalized set of recommen-
dations from the Apricity:
The machine said the man should eat tangerines. It listed two other
recommendations as well, so three in total. A modest number,
Pearl assured the man as she read out the list that had appeared on
the screen before her: one, he should eat tangerines on a regular
basis; two, he should work at a desk that received morning light;
three, he should amputate the uppermost section of his right index
finger.'
Pearl, the technician tasked with operating the device, watches the man raise
his right hand before his face and wonders if he is going to cry. She assures
him that his recommendation is "modest" compared to others she has seen
and reminds him that the system boasts a 99.97% approval rating. "The
proof is borne out in the numbers," she concludes.'
Writing about artificial intelligence requires a certain dose of imagina-
tion. This has always been the case. It is not just because artificial intelli-
gence draws more than its fair share of attention in science fiction and
fantasy circles, although this certainly plays a part. It is also, and perhaps
more importantly, because the term artificial intelligence conjures up images
of a world that does not currently exist. When most people think of artificial
intelligence, they think of superpowered computers that act and think like
human beings, with complicated motives, wide-ranging capacities, and often
dangerous tendencies. This combination of qualities simply does not exist in
' KATE WILLIAMS, ThLL THE MACHINE GOODNIGHT (Ist ed. 2018).
2 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 2.
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the state of today's artificial intelligence research. As more than one artificial
intelligence researcher has remarked, most of the people making the dooms-
day prognostications of artificial intelligence do not actually work in the
field. Those that do have significantly more modest forecasts about the po-
tential of artificial intelligence. This is not to say that they believe artificial
intelligence is an ineffective technology. It is just that they understand its
limitations.
At the same time, artificial intelligence algorithms have undeniably
made significant advances in recent years. Improved algorithms, bigger data
sets, and more powerful computers have combined to give machine learning
strategies ever-growing capabilities. In the last decade alone, we have wit-
nessed machine learning-based computers beat the world's best Jeopardy
contestants,4 accurately identify breast cancer from pathology slides,5 and
drive cars around the streets of Phoenix, Arizona.6 Governments around the
world are researching autonomous weapons systems that could potentially
mark a major shift in the nature of warfare and national security.'
Financial institutions, intrigued by the potential of machine learning,
have begun to explore how to incorporate artificial intelligence into their
own businesses. In recent years, large investment banks have hired away
talented experts from academia and Silicon Valley to head up machine learn-
ing divisions.' Fintech startups have created credit rating models and fraud
detection algorithms based on artificial intelligence strategies.9 And high-
frequency traders, quantitative hedge funds, and robo-advisors are imple-
menting artificial intelligence into their businesses as well.'0 "Artificial fi-
nancial intelligence" will likely take on increasing importance in years to
come.
But how should our legal structures respond to the rise of artificial fi-
nancial intelligence? Should we attempt to encourage it, in the hopes of nur-
4 STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: THE STORY OF WATSON, THE COMPUTER THAT WILL
TRANSFORM OUR WORLD 251 (1st ed. 2012).
See Jessica Kent, Google Deep Learning Tool 99% Accurate at Breast Cancer Detection,
HEALTH IT ANALYTICS, (Oct. 22, 2018), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/google-deep-learn-
ing-tool-99-accurate-at-breast-cancer-detection.
' See Tim Higgins & Jack Nicas, Waymo's Self-Driving Milepost: Humans Take a Back-
seat, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/waymos-self-driving-mile-
post-humans-take-a-backseat-I510070401.
'See generally Rebecca Crootoff, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347 (2016); Rebecca Crootoff, Autonomour Weapons Systems and the
Limits of Analogy, 9 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 51 (2018); GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, BELFER
CTR. FOR SCI. & INTL' AFFAIRS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (2017).
8 See Sarah Butcher, The Top Machine Learning Teams in Investment Banks, EFINANC[AL-
CAREERS, (May 23, 2018), https://news.efinancialcareers.com/us-en/315969/top-machine-
learning-teams-banks.
' See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 240 (2018).
0 See Machine-Learning Promises to Shake Up Large Swathes of Finance, THE EcONO-
MIST (May 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/05/25/ma-
chine-learning-promises-to-shake-up-large-swathes-of-finance.
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turing a potentially transformative technology? Or should we try to restrict
it, out of concerns about its broader risks for society? Is it possible to do
both? In order to answer these questions, we must first identify the problems
that artificial financial intelligence poses, and the sources from which these
problems spring. Many scholars argue that artificial intelligence poses exis-
tential questions about the nature of discrimination, the future of work, and
the repercussions of super-human intelligence.'' This Article, however, will
take a somewhat contrarian position. It will argue that the primary danger of
artificial financial intelligence is not so much that it will surpass human in-
telligence, but rather that it will exacerbate human error.12
Artificial financial intelligence can magnify the effects of human error
in three ways. First, because artificial intelligence techniques, and in particu-
lar machine learning algorithms, rely heavily on identifying patterns in his-
torical data, use of these techniques will tend to lead to results that
perpetuate the status quo in the data. Thus, if the data used to train artificial
intelligence algorithms is flawed, either through poor selection methods or
unavoidable problems in the external market itself, the resulting outputs of
artificial intelligence will reflect (and, indeed, strengthen) those flaws. Sec-
ond, because many of the most powerful artificial intelligence strategies are
the least transparent or explainable, decisionmakers within financial institu-
tions may give more weight to the results of the algorithms than they are
due. It is a well-known problem in machine learning, and in particular in the
sub-fields of deep learning and neural networks, that the complexity of the
methods used to reach a given result makes identifying a particular reason,
" See Tom C. W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L. J. 1253, 1254 (2017)
(arguing that artificial intelligence risks widespread market manipulation); Rory Van Loo, Dig-
ital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REv. 815 (2019) (arguing that Al-based automated assist-
ants "could make some large markets more volatile, raising unemployment costs or financial
stability concerns as more firms fail"); Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default:
Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531, 544-45 (2018) (arguing that the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should exert additional authority to inspect financial
algorithms); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEo.
L. J. 235, 275 (2019) (arguing that "[g]iven the potential for [Al and machine learning] to
result in widespread, cascading costs, mapping the likely performance of sophisticated algo-
rithms becomes especially necessary"); Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for
the Second Machine Age: The Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures
Markets, 2015 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 439, 440 (2015) ("[H]umans who are operating as fu-
tures market intermediaries . . . are likely to be displaced by digital intermediaries, that is,
artificial agents that perform critical roles related to enabling customers to access the futures
and derivatives markets."); Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Technologies and
the Tech Nirvana Fallacy, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 457, 2019) (analyz-
ing the ways in which modern algorithms exacerbate agency problems in corporate law).
2 Other scholars have made related points in other contexts, such as discrimination. See
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 671, 671
(2016) ("[A]n algorithm is only as good as the data it works with. Data is frequently imper-
fect in ways that allow these algorithms to inherit the prejudices of prior decision makers.");
More recently, financial regulation scholars have turned to this problem as well. See Tom C.W.
Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 99 FoRDHAM L. Rev. 531, 531 (2019) (ex-
amining the "perils and pitfalls of artificial codes, data bias, virtual threats, and systemic risks
relating to financial artificial intelligence.").
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or even several reasons, for the result difficult to do. Combined with cogni-
tive decision biases related to availability and herding effects, we can expect
that artificial financial intelligence will be hard to resist in financial deci-
sionmaking processes. Finally, because much of the financial industry de-
pends not just on predicting what will happen in the world, but also on
predicting what other people will predict will happen in the world, it is likely
that small errors in artificial intelligence (either in data, programming, or
execution) will have outsized effects on markets. The artificial intelligence
strategies of one firm may interact unpredictably with the artificial intelli-
gence strategies of other firms." The resulting echo effects could harm both
the efficiency of markets and the stability of financial systems.14
What does this mean for financial regulation? In a way, it is a cause for
optimism. Financial regulators are well-placed to deal with artificial finan-
cial intelligence because they have a wide array of laws and regulations cov-
ering the relevant behaviors-ensuring fairness, promoting efficiency, and
protecting stability. While accomplishing these goals will not be easy, the
general categories of problems are ones to which financial regulators are
accustomed. At the same time, regulating artificial financial intelligence may
require slightly different regulatory mechanisms, or at least targets. Under-
standing and monitoring artificial financial intelligence may, and indeed
likely will, require specialized expertise. It may also call for more intrusive
and hands-on inspections of sensitive business data. We may not need better
laws, but we do need better information.
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
The computer science field of artificial intelligence has exploded in re-
cent years. New advances in technical approaches, computing power, and
the availability of data have led to notable successes in a variety of applica-
tions, from image recognition" to natural language processing6 to medical
diagnoses7 to game strategy.'" These advances have brought renewed atten-
" See Rory Van Loo, The Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DuKE L.J. 1267, 1294 (2017)
(discussing the unpredictable ways that different firms' algorithmic pricing tools may interact).
1 See Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARv. Bus. L. Rnv. 158, 158 (2019) (argu-
ing that financial regulators should adopt a precautionary approach to regulating financial al-
gorithms due to their potential to create systemic risk for the broader financial system).
15 See Parmy Olson, Image-Recognition Technology May Not Be as Secure as We Think,
WALL Sr. J., (June 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/image-recognition-technology-may-
not-be-as-secure-as-we-think-i 1559700300.
16 See Tom Young, et al., Recent Trends in Deep Learning Based Natural Language
Processing, ARXIV 1708.02709 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.02709.pdf.
17 See A. Michael Froomkin, et al., When Als Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Chal-
lenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARiz. L. REv. 33 (2019).
" See Nick Statt, How Artificial Intelligence Will Revolutionize the Way Video Games Are
Developed and Played, THE VERGE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/6/
18222203/video-game-ai-future-procedural-generation-deep-leaming; George Anadiotis, The
State of AI in 2019: Breakthroughs in Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing,
Games, and Knowledge Graphs, ZDNEr (July 8, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-
3412020]
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tion to artificial intelligence in the business world and, in particular, in the
financial industry. Financial firms, who have always relied heavily on statis-
tics and quantitative analysis in their services, are a natural fit for artificial
intelligence strategies. Artificial intelligence, after all, attempts to identify
patterns and probabilities from historical data in order to improve results,
such as predicting future statistics or identifying complicated associations.
Increasingly, financial firms, such as quant hedge funds, high-frequency
traders, and robo-advisors, are turning to artificial intelligence to improve
their own results. This new artificial financial intelligence ecosystem has, in
turn, generated its fair share of hand-wringing in policy and academic cir-
cles, where scholars have worried about cyber-systems that could potentially
exceed human capabilities. This Part will describe the rise of artificial intelli-
gence, its use in the financial industry, and the existing literature on how
policymakers should respond to it.
A. The Technology of Artificial Intelligence
What is artificial intelligence? The term has many meanings, a problem
derived from its long history in computer science and popular fiction.'9 The
term itself is generally believed to have originated in 1956, when a
Dartmouth mathematics professor, John McCarthy, used it in connection
with a conference he was organizing on the topic of thinking machines.2 0 But
the general outlines of the idea go back much further. Edgar Allan Poe wrote
an essay in 1836 about a mechanical chess player called The Turk that was
purportedly better than any human.2 1 Alan Turing, at least as early as 1950,
was directly tackling the question of whether computers could think.22 Tur-
ing famously concluded that the question itself was ill-formed and instead
needed to be reconceptualized as whether machines could act in such a way
that they would be indistinguishable from humans.23 In order to determine
this, he developed a test, now called the Turing test, in which a human,
corresponding through text with two players, one of whom was a human and
one of whom was a computer, attempted to determine which one was
human.24 If he could not, then, under the Turing test, the computer could be
said to be intelligent.
state-of-ai-in-2019-breakthroughs-in-machine-learning-natural-language-processing-games-
and-knowledge-graphs/.
" See NAT'L SC. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE 5 (2016).20 
See NILs J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 52-56 (2009).
21 See EDGAR ALLAN POE, Maelzel's Chess-Player, in Edgar Allan Poe: Complete Tales
and Poems 373 (2003).
22 Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950).
2 Id. at 433-34.
24 It turns out that the Turing test has generated its fair share of controversy, both with
respect to whether individual computers have in fact passed it and with respect to whether the
test itself is a good indicator of true intelligence on the part of machines.
[Vol. 10342
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More modem definitions of artificial intelligence tend to be somewhat
more inclusive. Berkeley computer scientist Stuart Russell defines artificial
intelligence as:
the study of methods for making computers behave intelligently.
Roughly speaking, a computer is intelligent to the extent that it
does the right thing rather than the wrong thing. The right thing is
whatever action is most likely to achieve the goal, or, in more
technical terms, the action that maximizes expected utility. 25
As an even cursory perusal of this selection will reveal, this definition runs
into its own set of problems. For one, we might say that a calculator does the
right thing when it says that 1 + 1 is 2, but most observers would not say
that it is behaving intelligently in any ordinary sense of the term. For an-
other, once we define intelligence to include an element of morality (does a
computer's action maximize expected utility?), we open the door to conten-
tious, unanswerable questions that distract from the technology itself. To
borrow from Socrates, if a user asks a computer for a sword, and the com-
puter receives the question, finds a sword for him in the real world,
purchases it, and then delivers it to him, most observers would conclude that
the computer is behaving intelligently.26 But if that same user requesting the
sword happens to be insane and plans to use it to harm himself or others,
then it would (normally) be wrong to give him the sword. Does this mean
that the computer is now not displaying artificial intelligence, because it is
doing the wrong thing, ethically speaking? These types of questions could be
raised for any conceivable use of a computer, and they are not closely con-
nected to the problems unique to artificial intelligence itself.
On the other side of the spectrum, narrower definitions of artificial in-
telligence tend to circumscribe the range of the field unnecessarily. Many
artificial intelligence researchers use the term artificial intelligence to refer
to a particular set of techniques or algorithms that computers can adopt to
achieve better results. So, in the 1980s, artificial intelligence became closely
associated with an approach to problem-solving known as "expert system"
design.27 Under expert systems, computers would be given a long set of if-
then rules that they could then apply to problems in a given field?" The logic
25 STUART RUSSELL, Q&A: THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, UNIV. OF CAL.
BERKELEY, http://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/-russell/temp/q-and-a.html.
26 The discussion of the madman and the sword takes place in The Republic, Book I.
Appropriately for this article, it involves the question of whether justice requires you to pay
your debts. See PLATO, REPUBLIC 6 (C. D. C. Reeve ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Pub.
Company, Inc. 2d ed. 1992) (c. 375 B.C.E.) ("Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man
lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend
shouldn't return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did.").
27 See generally PAUL HARMON & DAVID KING, EXPERT SYSTEMS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE IN BUSINESS (1985); Bruce G. Buchanan & Reid G. Smith, Fundamentals of Expert
Systems, in 4 HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 149 (Avron Barr, et al. eds. 1981-89).
28 
See ROBERT A. EDMUNos, THE PRENTICE HALL GUIDE TO EXPERT SYSTEMS 28-31
(1988).
2020] 343
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of expert systems was that humans who are specialists in a field tend to
behave according to a number of heuristics, and if those heuristics could
simply be identified and then hard-coded into a set of simple rules for com-
puters, then computers could achieve similar or even superior results to spe-
cialists.29 It turned out that expert systems did not live up to the high
expectations of researchers, and their limitations eventually led to a decline
in interest in artificial intelligence generally.3 0
More recently, however, artificial intelligence has had something of a
renaissance, becoming associated with a new and promising technique
known as deep learning."1 Deep learning is a sophisticated, data-driven
model from a field of computer science known as machine learning. Ma-
chine learning, rather than relying on a set of rules established by a program-
mer, as in expert systems, instead starts with a data set and then attempts to
derive rules on its own.3 2 For example, a computer might be given a set of
images with labels attached-this is a person, this is a tree, this is a dog-
and be asked to use the images (the "training set") to establish rules for
identifying when an image contains those objects.33 The machine learning
algorithm might then check the accuracy of these rules against another set of
images (the "test set") to see if the rules work well outside of the original
context.4 Many different variants of machine learning exist, and one particu-
lar variant, known as deep learning, has had notable success in recent
years.35 In deep learning algorithms, neural networks or units identify pat-
terns in data, transform those patterns into outputs, and then pass those out-
puts along to additional units. 36 The first "layer" of units might identify
patterns in the data, and then the next layer might identify patterns of pat-
tems in the data, and so on and so forth.3 The algorithms associated with
deep learning techniques have proven remarkably accurate at improving ac-
curacy and predictive power in machines, and they have become synony-
mous with artificial intelligence in many circles.
2 9See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L. J. 1972, 1998-99 (2017).
See DANIEL CREVIER, Al: THE TUMUITUOus SEARCH FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
204-8 (1993).
3 See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 399, 402 (2017); Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217,
1219-20 (2016); Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REv.
1277, 1284-90 (2018).
32 See KEvIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECIlVE 1 (2012)
("[W]e define machine learning as a set of methods that can automatically detect patterns in
data, and then use the uncovered patterns to predict future data, or to perform other kinds of
decision making under uncertainty . . . .").
3 See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 684-88 (2017).
34 Id.
1 Id. at 669-70.





But defining artificial intelligence in such a narrow way, to encompass
a small set of algorithmic techniques and to exclude all others, has its
problems as well. The explosion of interest in deep learning has only oc-
curred in the last few years, and it may well be that other, newer strategies
will emerge that tackle the same issues but use different methods. These
newer strategies may well be more effective than older ones. There would
not appear to be any categorical reasons for excluding new algorithmic strat-
egies from the definition of artificial intelligence simply because they are
unorthodox or new.
It is hard to regulate what we cannot define." Hopefully this discussion
clarifies some of the confusion in the field about what precisely we are talk-
ing about when we talk about artificial intelligence. Some people use it to
refer generally to any instance when a computer performs an action cor-
rectly, while others use it to refer to a specific set of algorithmic strategies
that are currently en vogue in the industry. When computer scientists talk
about the AI revolution of recent years, they tend to be talking about the
machine learning and deep learning strategies that researchers have deployed
to such great success in certain fields. But policymakers, news media and
commentators often use artificial intelligence to refer more generally to
thinking machines, regardless of the actual techniques that the machines are
using to accomplish their feats. It may be most useful to conceive of artifi-
cial intelligence as a spectrum, with the capacity to perform simple tasks
(such as arithmetic and other basic mathematical calculations) at the low
end, the capacity to match human performance somewhere in the middle,
and the capacity to outperform humans at the high end. This conception is
itself simplistic (computers are already better than humans at many tasks,
while simultaneously being worse than humans at many others), but it helps
clarify the range of potential artificial intelligence applications in the world.
And while this Article will focus in particular on machine learning, it is
worthwhile to keep in mind that some other technique may come along that
replaces it.
Now that we have settled on a workable definition of artificial intelli-
gence, we can now turn to its real-world uses. In particular, it is useful for
our purposes (that is, understanding how artificial intelligence is affecting
the financial industry, and how it might do so in the future) to know the
types of things that current instantiations of artificial intelligence are good at
doing. It is also important to know why they are good at doing these things.
A list of the accomplishments of artificial intelligence in the last decade
is breathtaking. Here is just a short list of some of the most noteworthy
achievements:
"s For an excellent analysis of the regulatory issues raised by the uncertain scope of "arti-
ficial intelligence" as a concept, see Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might be a Robot,
105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). Lemly and Casey conclude that, in fact, there is no
correct definition of artificial intelligence for regulators, and that regulators should instead
focus on behaviors and actions.
2020] 345
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* In 2011, IBM's computing system, Watson, won a game of Jeopardy
against two of the game show's most successful contestants, Ken Jen-
nings and Brad Rutter, with a final tally of $77,147 to Jennings'
$24,000 and Rutter's $21,600;3"
* Between 2010 and 2017, in a popular image recognition contest,
deep learning algorithms lowered their error rate from 28% to 2.3%
(surpassing humans, who, on average have a 5% error rate);"
* In 2016, by reviewing and analyzing all published literature on ALS,
or Lou Gehrig's disease, IBM's Watson system was able to identify
five previously unknown genes related to the disease;41
* In 2017, a computer program known as AlphaGo defeated the
world's best player of the board game Go with a score of three
matches to zero;42
* In 2017, countries deployed forty-nine different automated weapons
systems that could detect and attack targets without human
intervention ;43
* In 2018, Waymo launched the world's first commercial self-driving
car service, a technology based heavily on machine learning
algorithms."
These remarkable advances, displayed across a wide and diverse array
of fields, have been made possible by three related developments: better al-
gorithms, deployed by more powerful computers, applied to ever greater
amounts of data.45 On the algorithm side, the major advances in recent years
have been driven by machine learning, which, as described above, refer to a
computer's ability to analyze data and develop models for recognizing pat-
terns and predicting future data-in other words, its ability to learn and im-
3 See STEPIEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: THE STORY OF WATSON, THE COMPUTER THAT
WILL TRANSFORM OUR WORLD 251 (2012).
'See Imagenet, Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge, http://image-net.org/chal-
lenges/LSVRC/2017/.
41 Emma Hinchliffe, IBM's Watson Supercomputer Discovers 5 New Genes Linked to ALS,
MASHABLE, (Dec. 14, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/12/14/ibm-watson-als-research/#oKfR
VPG3C8ql.
42 A later version of the AlphaGo algorithm, known as AlphaGo Zero, defeated the prior
version of AlphaGo 100 games to zero. See Larry Greenemeier, Al versus AI: Self-Taught
AlphaGo Zero Vanquishes Its Predecessor, ScmwrlFc AMERICAN, (Oct. 18, 2017).
41 See VINCENT BOULANIN & MAAIKE VERBRUGGEN, MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENf OF Au-
TONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 26 (2017).
" See Shuyang Cheng & Gabriel Bender, Autonomous Driving, MEDIUM, (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://medium.com/waymo/automl-automating-the-design-of-machine-leaming-models-for-
autonomous-driving-141a5583ec2a ("At Waymo, machine learning plays a key role in nearly
every part of our self-driving system. It helps our cars see their surroundings, make sense of
the world, predict how others will behave, and decide their next best move.").
4 See NAT'L Sci. & ThCH. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 6; STANFORD UNIVERSITY ONE
HUNDRED YEAR STUDY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 51 (2016).
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prove its performance over time.46 Advancements in the sub-field of deep
learning have played particularly important roles in this success.47 These ad-
vancements have, in turn, been supported by enormous leaps in computing
power.48 Moore's Law-the famous proposition that the number of compo-
nents per integrated circuit, and thus processing power, doubles roughly
every eighteen to twenty-four months-demonstrates the magnitude of per-
formance improvement over time.49 If human populations followed the same
trend, a village of 100 people in 1970 would have grown to 1.7 billion peo-
ple by 2018. Even more relevant for artificial intelligence is the vast im-
provement in the speed of graphical processing units (GPUs) used in the
field. 0 In 2000, Nvidia's top-of-the-line desktop GPU, the GeForce 256
DDR, had a processing power of 480 million operations per second. By
2018, Nvidia's top desktop GPU, the Titan RTX, had reached a processing
power of 16,312 gigaflops, a speed more than 30,000 times faster." The
vastly greater computational capacity of modem-day computers, combined
with effective machine learning algorithms, have been unleashed on the
massive amounts of data made available by the internet age.52 With the rise
of the internet and mobile computing, people are generating more data, and
more sensitive and personalized data, than they have ever done before. This
information has proven a fertile source of training data for artificial intelli-
gence.53 As the computer scientist Andy Hertzfeld has stated, the artificial
intelligence revolution of recent years
couldn't have happened no matter how brilliant your algorithm
was twenty years ago, because billions were just out of reach. But
what they found was that by just increasing the scale, suddenly
things started working incredibly well. It kind of shocked the com-
puter science world, that they started working so good.54
So artificial intelligence has made enormous leaps in ability in recent
years, and these leaps have made it both practical and efficient for firms and
' See Calo, supra note 31, at 402.
47 Id. at 401-02.
48 See Alan Stevens, GPU Computing: Accelerating the Deep Learning Curve, ZDNEr,
(July 2, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/gpu-computing-accelerating-the-deep-learning-
curve/.
" For a broader discussion of the effects of Moore's law on artificial intelligence, see John
0. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253 (2010).
' See Michael Byrne, Why Machine Learning Needs GPUs, MOTHERBOARD, (Jan. 9,
2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en us/article/kznnnn/why-machine-learning-needs-gpus.
5' See CPUREvmw, nVidia GeForce 256 DDR, http://www.gpureview.com/GeForce256-
DDR-card-114.html; SKUEZTECH, Nvidia Titan RIX, http://www.skueztech.com/db/gpu/
nvidia-titan-rtx.
52 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671 (2016); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 393 (2014).
* See Calo, supra note 31, at 420-25.
54
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governments to use artificial intelligence to improve their day-to-day opera-
tions. And at least for now, there are no signs of this progress slowing down.
B. Artificial Intelligence Strategies in Finance
The remarkable power of artificial intelligence to identify patterns in
complicated data and use these patterns to predict future behavior has made
the field a major area of interest for financial firms. This is true both for the
large Wall Street banks that have traditionally dominated finance and for the
wave of smaller, nimbler fintech firms that have sprung up to challenge them
in recent years. On the one hand, large financial institutions like JP Morgan,
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley are increasingly hiring machine learn-
ing specialists and creating entire divisions devoted to artificial intelli-
gence.5 On the other, a handful of smaller, more focused financial firms
have turned to artificial intelligence as a primary strategy for their busi-
nesses.56 These trends suggest that artificial intelligence will likely play a
large role in determining the future of the financial sector.5 7
The potential uses of artificial intelligence in finance are nearly limit-
less. As Charles Elkan, the head of machine learning at Goldman Sachs, has
said, "within every business area there are opportunities to apply machine
learning."" That said, most financial firms to date have focused on a few
key areas where machine learning has obvious applications. First, they are
using artificial intelligence to improve credit risk assessments for
counterparties. Second, they are using it to protect themselves from fraud
and wrongdoing, either external or internal to the firm. And third, they are
using it to devise better trading strategies. It may be helpful to look at each
of these areas in turn to get a better sense of how artificial intelligence can
affect the financial world. One should keep in mind that most financial firms
are relatively tight-lipped about how, precisely, they are using artificial intel-
ligence in their businesses. It is, after all, competitively valuable informa-
tion. At the same time, broad categories may be identified."9
" See Sarah Butcher, The Top Machine Learning Teams in Investment Banks, EFINANCIAL-
CAREERS, May 23, 2018.
5 See Sameer Maskey, How Artificial Intelligence is Helping Financial Institutions,
FORBES, (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/12/05/how-arti-
ficial-intelligence-is-helping-financial-institutions/#441cd632460a.
" See Thomas Vartanian, Nefarious Nations Will Take the Lead on AI If the US Doesn't,
THE HILL, (Dec. 12, 2018) ("As part of the country's critical infrastructure, the highest priority
should be given to the development of a financial services and capital markets strategy to
foster Al innovations while at the same time protecting against its unprecedented threats.").
" Charles Elkan, Will Machine Learning Transform Finance, YALE INSIGHTs, (Jan. 3,
2019), https://insights.som.yale.edulinsights/will-machine-leaming-transform-finance.
" For a comprehensive industry survey of bankers' opinion on artificial intelligence in
finance, see Laura Noonan, AI in Banking: The Reality Behind the Hype, FINANCIAL TIMES,
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b497al34-2d21-l1e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f.
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Perhaps no area of artificial financial intelligence has received as much
attention (or criticism) than its use in credit ratings.60 Banks are in the busi-
ness of loaning money to people-bank loan volume is a carefully watched
sign, not just of bank profits, but also of economic health more generally.6 '
One of the primary concerns that banks have when they extend a loan, -of
course, is that the borrower may not pay the money back. This means that
the ability to accurately predict the credit risk of borrowers is tremendously
important (and valuable) to financial institutions as a whole. They often out-
source this process to credit scoring agencies, such as Equifax, Experian,
and TransUnion. But as many observers have noted, the credit rating agen-
cies' process itself is far from perfect.62 Joe Nocera of the New York Times
has written that a "credit score is derived after an information-gathering pro-
cess that is anything but rigorous" but, nevertheless, "essentially . . . has
become the only thing that matters anymore to the banks and other institu-
tions that underwrite mortgages."63 Many financial firms believe that ma-
chine learning algorithms could do better. The theoretical benefits are clear.
By sifting through massive amounts of prior data about both defaulting and
non-defaulting borrowers, machine learning algorithms might be able to
identify hidden or unexpected variables that affect a borrower's likelihood of
repaying a loan. Rather than relying on simple and obvious relations, such as
whether a borrower has defaulted on past loans or has large amounts of
credit card debt, machine learning algorithms might find that other, less no-
ticeable information, such as a borrower's purchase history, friend group, or
Twitter posts, provides meaningful information about his ability to repay a
loan. And indeed, financial firms are increasingly using artificial intelligence
to make these difficult assessments. For example, Zest Finance, a fintech
startup based in California, offers a machine learning-based credit modeling
product for mortgages, auto loans, business loans, and consumer loans. 4 It
claims that its algorithm, on average, leads to a 15% increase in loan ap-
proval rates and a 30% decrease in charge-off rates, and that it only requires
' See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Auto-
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2014); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bit-
Credit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 858 (2018); Matthew A. Bruckner,
Regulating Fintech Lending, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 7 (2018); Matthew
Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders' Use of Big Data, 93 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 60 (2018).
" See Peter Eavis, Is a Slowdown in Bank Lending a Bad Sign for the Economy, N.Y.
TmIEs, (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/business/dealbook/bank-lend-
ing-slowdown-economy.html; Rachel Louise Ensign, Business-Loan Drought Ends for Banks,
WALL S-r. J., (July 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/business-loan-drought-ends-for-
banks- 1531058400.
62 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 60, at 10-16.
63 Joe Nocera, Credit Score Is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. TInMES, (July 23, 2010), https://
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/business/24nocera.html.
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three months to implement.15 The German startup Kreditech uses big data
and machine learning to assess borrowers' creditworthiness and even extends
loans, both domestically and internationally, in real time using its automated
system.6 Their model is so attractive and effective that some of the credit
scoring agencies are themselves getting into the game, with Equifax recently
adopting machine learning in its models and Experian similarly offering a
machine learning product to their clients.67 And, to be clear, the effects of
Al-enhanced credit rating are not simply negative, providing a rationale for
declining a loan to someone who might otherwise have received one. Al
may also show that certain groups have been systematically underrated by
current systems, and thus more deserving of loans than traditionally
believed.
Artificial intelligence also plays an important role in financial institu-
tions' identification and prevention of fraud and wrongdoing. Finding effec-
tive ways to prevent fraudulent payments or claims has been a constant thorn
in the side of the financial industry. And despite considerable fforts, fraud
is rising-in 2016, 15.4 million U.S. consumers were victims of identity
fraud, an all-time high, leading to $16 billion in losses.68 Most of these losses
stem from credit card fraud.6 9 In order to better identify these fraudulent
behaviors and, ideally, prevent them before they occur, financial institutions
are increasingly turning to machine learning algorithms.70 Machine learning
algorithms, after all, can analyze and assess the tremendous amounts of
transaction data constantly flowing across the sector much more quickly
than a human ever could. Bank of America is exploring how to incorporate
artificial intelligence into its fraud detection systems.71 The startup Feedzai
specializes in using machine learning to prevent fraudulent payments in the
financial industry, and its success has led Citigroup to incorporate its prod-
uct into its own fraud prevention systems.72 Monzo, the popular British
credit card company, deployed a machine learning model for preventing
fraud in its prepaid debit cards, allowing it to reduce fraud rates from 0.84%
65 See ZEsTAI, What is ZAML?, https://www.zest.ai/zaml.
66 See WALL ST. J., Germany's Kreditech Scores $40M for Automated Lending, (June 25,
2014).
67 See Alex Hickey, Equifax Debuts Machine Leaning-Based Credit Scoring System, CIO
DIVE (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.ciodive.com/news/equifax-debuts-machine-leaming-based-
credit-scoring-system/520095/.
' See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Peter Rudegeair, Credit-Card Fraud Keeps Rising, Despite
New Security Chips-Study, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-
card-fraud-keeps-rising-despite-new-security-chipsstudy-1485954000.
69 Id.
70 See Sara Castellanos & Kim S. Nash, Bank ofAmerica confronts AI's "Black Box" With
Fraud Detection Effort, WALL ST. J., (May 11, 2018), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/05/1 1/
bank-of-america-confronts-ais-black-box-with-fraud-detection-effort/.
7' Id.
72 See Bus. WIRE, Citi Partners with Feedzai to Provide Machine Learning Payment Solu-
tions, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181219005388/en/Citi-
Partners-Feedzai-Provide-Machine-Learning-Payment.
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to less than 0.0 1% in just six months." Other financial institutions are exper-
imenting with using machine learning more broadly to prevent bad behavior
among their own employees. In 2018, ING Bank partnered with a machine
learning startup specializing in speech recognition to spot and stop insider
trading and collusion within the firm.74
Finally, financial firms are also using artificial intelligence to improve
investment returns. Again, the change here is more a matter of degree than
of kind. Investment firms, both large and small, have long used computers to
analyze stock information, identify price discrepancies, and make invest-
ments." The artificial intelligence revolution of recent years, however, has
opened up new avenues for incorporating algorithms more deeply into in-
vestment strategies. One clear use case is for quant hedge funds, which use
algorithms to determine investment decisions.76 Already familiar (and com-
fortable) with computerized, automated investment decisions, quant hedge
funds might be expected to be early adopters of machine learning strategies.
And indeed, it appears that they are. In 2017, one study found that 20% of
hedge funds make use of machine learning or artificial intelligence in their
investment strategies.7 Just a year later, that number had risen to 56%.11
Large investment firms are investing heavily in machine learning as well.
BlackRock, the asset management company, uses artificial intelligence to
spot trends in financial data, including finding relationships between securi-
ties or market indicators, scanning social media for insights into employee
sentiment, and analyzing search engines for popular search terms.79 Regular
investors can now take advantage of machine learning-based investment
strategies as well. In 2017, EquBot launched an exchange traded fund, called
AT Powered Equity, that uses machine learning algorithms to decide on its
investment components.0 EquBot states that its mission is to "give everyone
7 See MONzo, FIGHTING FRAUD WITH MACHINE LEARNING, (Feb. 3, 2017), https://monzo
.com/blog/2017/02/03/fighting-fraud-with-machine-leaming/; see also THE EcONOMIST, Ma-
chine-Learning Promises to Shake Up Large Swathes of Finance, (May 25, 2017), https://
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/05/25/machine-learning-promises-to-
shake-up-large-swathes-of-finance.
7 See Intelligent Voice, Compliance Monitoring Enters Al Age at ING with Intelligence
Voice and Relativity Trace, (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.intelligentvoice.com/2018/12/03/com-
pliance-monitoring-enters-ai-age-at-ing-with-intelligent-voice-and-relativity-trace.
" See, e.g., Edward L. Pittman, Quantitative Investment Models, Errors, and the Federal
Securities Laws, 13 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 633, 643-63 (2017).
76 See generally Thomas J. Brennan & Andrew W. Lo, Dynamic Loss Probabilities and
Implications for Financial Regulation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 692-95 (2014); Scorr PAT-
TERSON, THE QUANTS: HoW A NEw BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND
NEARLY DESTROYED IT (2011).
" See Amy Whyte, More Hedge Funds Using AI, Machine Learning, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR (July 19, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/bl94hmlkjbvd37/More-
Hedge-Funds-Using-Al-Machine-Learning.
78 Id.
" See Conrad De Aenlle, A.I. Has Arrived in Investing. Humans Are Still Dominating.,
N.Y. TIMEs, (Jan. 12, 2018).
" See Bailey McCann, The Artificial-Intelligent Investor: Al Funds Beckon, WALL ST. J.,
(Nov. 5, 2017).
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access to investment opportunities that artificial intelligence can uncover."s"
Another potential use for artificial financial intelligence is in investment
banking, where firms might use artificial intelligence algorithms to identify
opportunities for acquisitions or divestments that might not be readily appar-
ent to insiders.8 2
All of these developments suggest hat artificial financial intelligence is
poised to become an integral part of the financial industry. Financial firms
are actively researching, and in many cases adopting, artificial intelligence
strategies. These strategies have been particularly useful in assessing risk,
preventing fraud, and investing capital. And the trend is clear-artificial fi-
nancial intelligence is on the rise. As further proof, one need only look as far
as the chartered financial analyst (CFA) exam, the prized certification for
future investment professionals. In 2019, the exam added computer science,
with a focus on artificial intelligence and data mining, as a new subject that
all aspiring CFAs must have familiarity with by 2020.83 Future bankers will
know much more about artificial intelligence than they do today.
C. Existing Literature
The stunning success of artificial intelligence in recent years has
sparked renewed interest in the field from academia. Scholars have begun to
ask pointed questions about the economic, social, and moral consequences
of turning over more and more of our lives to the control of algorithms.
Legal scholars, as they are wont to do, have proposed new laws to constrain
and guide the use of artificial intelligence. And while the literature is broad
and continually growing, much like artificial intelligence itself, a few com-
mon threads can be identified in the scholarship. First, a group of scholars
has argued that the progress of artificial intelligence risks widespread nega-
tive effects on labor markets. Second, a number of scholars have argued that
the results of artificial intelligence are so difficult to explain, and, thus, to
scrutinize and monitor, that artificial intelligence will end up undermining
the regulatory state. Finally, a group of scholars has argued that artificial
intelligence methods might perpetuate racial or other discrimination in
broader society.
On the question of employment, a number of scholars have raised con-
cerns about artificial intelligence's capacity to supplant and replace human
workers." Indeed, President Barack Obama issued a report on the topic, con-
" EquBot Website, https://equbot.com. The ETF has, however, underperformed-from its
inception in October 2017 to the end of 2018, it rose 3.1%, while the S&P 500 rose 5.1%. See
De Aenlle, supra note 79.
82 See Elkan, supra note 58.
8 See Trevor Hunnicutt, CFA Exam to Add Artificial Intelligence, "Big Data" Questions,
REUTERS, (May 23, 2017).
" See MARTIN FORD, THE RISE OF THE ROBOTS: ThCHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A
JOBLESS FUTURE (2016); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, Human Work in the Robotic
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cluding that we need new policies and laws to "educate and prepare new
workers to enter the workforce, cushion workers who lose jobs, keep them
attached to the labor force, and combat inequality."*5 The idea of machines
replacing humans in the labor force is not new-they have been doing so
since the Industrial Revolution. But artificial intelligence's vastly greater
power, combined with its speed of improvement and breadth of application,
present these concerns on a grander scale. Some scholars argue that artificial
intelligence will lead to job losses as artificial intelligence simply eliminates
the need for human workers in many fields. 6 Others argue that even if artifi-
cial intelligence does not lead to job losses, it will still lead to increased
wealth disparities (or "income polarization") as the techno-savvy reap the
benefits of cheaper labor and the techno-ignorant are relegated to low wages
and long hours." In either case, the artificial intelligence revolution could
cause major labor force disruptions.
Another group of scholars has argued that the problem with artificial
intelligence is explainability."8 One of the issues with machine learning-pro-
duced results is that they are often difficult to interpret in easily understood
language. Imagine, for example, if you asked a bank why they turned you
down for a loan, and, in reply, they handed you the source code of their
machine learning algorithm and the values of millions of automatically
tuned algorithm parameters-this might be an accurate description of what
they had in fact done to reach their result, but it would not be very helpful
for understanding the motivation for the decision, or what you might do to
change it. This is less of a problem in some fields than in others. For exam-
ple, if a machine learning algorithm is better at spotting cancer than human
experts, we probably do not care much about how it is doing it. If it turns out
that the machine learning algorithm spotted a complex array of patterns that
have no intuitive counterpart in human reason, we probably would not care,
as long as it works. But when we turn from the world of facts (do I have
cancer?) to a world of judgment (should I loan money to this person?), then
the process and rationale of the decisionmaker suddenly takes on greater
importance. Regulators need to understand algorithms in order to ensure
Future: Policy for the Age of Automation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (July/Aug., 2016); Calo, supra
note 31, at 425-27.
"EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE
ECONOMY (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/docu-
ments/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.pdf.
8 See Michael Guihot, et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial
Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 'IbCH. L. 385 (2017).
8 See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment
Law, 128 YALE L. J. 254 (2018).
" See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explain-
able Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the
Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
653 (2017); Joshua A. Kroll, et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017).
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they comply with the law.89 Consumers need to understand the algorithms to
trust that they have been dealt with fairly, and to be able to change their
behaviors.0 Indeed, the European Union has gone so far as to require com-
panies that employ automated decisionmaking to provide "meaningful infor-
mation about the logic involved."91 As one group of scholars has put it,
"[b]ecause automated decision systems can return potentially incorrect, un-
justified, or unfair results, additional approaches are needed to make such
systems accountable and governable.""
In a similar vein, some scholars worry that the deployment of artificial
intelligence could lead to disguised discrimination.93 The logic is as follows.
Machine learning algorithms attempt to identify patterns in large data sets,
and then draw conclusions from those patterns. In order to do their work,
then, machine learning algorithms must be fed data, and large amounts of it.
But that data itself is not necessarily neutral. It may (in fact, it likely will)
incorporate some form of bias or discrimination from the outside world. And
if the data is biased or discriminatory, then the machine learning algorithm
itself may become biased or discriminatory, too. This could happen in one of
two ways: first, a nefarious actor might intentionally feed the machine learn-
ing algorithm bad data;9 4 and second, a perfectly innocent, but naive, actor
might unintentionally use data that has unrecognized bias in it." As an ex-
ample of the first problem, intentional discrimination, if a firm (or a rogue
employee at a firm) wanted to refrain from doing business with individuals
of certain races or religions, it might construct a machine learning algorithm
that looked unbiased but in fact encoded certain nefarious factors. After all,
software engineers are the ones who have to make the hard decisions about
what data to use, how to structure the data, and how to interpret it. Bias
could creep in at any of these levels, and it might be difficult for outside
observers to detect. But even if there is no intentional discrimination in the
machine learning algorithm or the data set, it may still reflect the effects of
past discrimination in the world. For example, if minorities received poor
credit scores in the past due to discrimination, then machine learning algo-
rithms might learn that these minorities should be scored lower than their
" See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 88, at 1089-90.
9 Id. at 1119-22.
' Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
* Kroll et al., supra note 88, at 633.
1 See id. at 678-82; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 60, at 10-16; Margaret Hu, Al-
gorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 88;
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REv. 1023 (2017); Sonia K. Katyal,
Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. Rnv. 54, 54 (2019)
(arguing that "[tihe issue of algorithmic bias represents a crucial new world of civil rights
concerns, one that is distinct in nature from the ones that preceded it"); Kate Crawford, Think
Again: Big Data, FOR. POL'Y, (May 10, 2013); Talia B. Gillis & Jann Spiess, Big Data and
Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. Rav. 458 (2019) (arguing that machine learning algorithms
hinder the application of discrimination laws).
' See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 33, at 703-05.
9 Id.
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the problem of "non-stationary" behavior.103 As noted before, scholars have
pointed out that if a data set reflects a biased world (such as low credit
scores for racial minorities), then machine learning algorithms based on
those data sets may well reinforce those biases. This is a major problem, and
has slightly different valences in the financial sector, which has a major
influence on the direction of economic development. Imagine, for example,
a machine learning algorithm that was trained on a data set from the period
of 1995 to 2000. Basing its recommendations on the relative success of vari-
ous industries during the dotcom boom, it might have concluded that, as a
general rule, technology startups vastly overperformed other sectors. It
might well have recommended that internet-focused companies such as
Pets.com (which raised $82 million in an IPO in 2000 before going bankrupt
just nine months later)'1 or GeoCities (which was bought by Yahoo for $3.6
billion in 1999 but quickly collapsed)105 were excellent investments. The ma-
chine learning algorithm, by basing its recommendations on prior data from
a market that was fundamentally different from the market post-2000, was
simply ineffective. The data was incurably biased. Similarly, the use of ma-
chine learning might lead to the prolongation or even perpetuation of short-
term trends in markets, to the detriment of economic efficiency. Without
data from the period after 2000, when the dotcom bubble burst, the machine
learning algorithm might well have recommended investments in the tech
sector and, by doing so, reinforced preexisting patterns of industry focus.
One potential consequence of this is that bubbles could become more dra-
matic-machine learning algorithms could magnify momentum in particular
sectors or trends, leading to eventual and catastrophic collapse. Another po-
tential consequence, and one that is perhaps even more troubling, is that
artificial financial intelligence might prevent bubbles from bursting. In other
words, if a large section of financial institutions uses machine learning algo-
rithms to decide on their investment strategies, and those machine learning
algorithms conclude that, say, the technology sector outperforms other sec-
tors, then it may be difficult for the market to self-correct. Other industries
might simply wither away from lack of investment or access to capital.
Third, the dependence of machine learning algorithms on data creates
strong incentives for financial institutions not only to put the data they cur-
rently have to better use, but also to gather more of it.11 6 If the quality of
artificial intelligence as a financial tool grows as the size of its data set in-
creases, then financial firms may search for new ways to get increasingly
"oSee MASASHI SUGIYAMA & MOTOAKi KAWANABE, MACHINE LEARNING IN NON-STA-
TIONARY ENVIRONMENTS: INTRODUCTION TO COVARIATE SHIFT ADAPFATION (2012).
'" See Pui-Wing Tam & Mylene Mangalindan, Pets.com Will Shut Down, Citing Insuffi-
cient Funding, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB97361747513691
7228.
105 See Robert Cyran, Yahoo Is a Case Study in Poor Timing, N.Y. TIAs, (July 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/business/dealbook/yahoo-is-a-case-study-in-poor-timing
.html.
" See Calo, supra note 31, at 420-23.
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intrusive and sensitive data on citizens. Their practices could quickly raise
privacy concerns. Part of the appeal of artificial intelligence is that it aims to
find patterns and relations that humans would never consider. But it cannot
find these patterns if it does not have data to work on. Engineers or invest-
ment advisers that decide what information to include in data sets therefore
have a potentially unlimited world of information to scour. Perhaps your
Facebook friend list contains useful information about your credit score. Per-
haps the prior personal relationships of a CEO have correlations with com-
pany performance. Perhaps the email patterns, mobile phone conversations,
or locations of consumers contain relevant information for mortgage default
rates. We have already seen a backlash against the tech giants for their gath-
ering, storage, and use of user data.107 But as the stories of privacy violations
proliferate, the value of data to firms is becoming increasingly clear. Artifi-
cial intelligence may accelerate that trend.
Finally, and on a related note, the data dependency of artificial intelli-
gence gives significant advantages to firms that have access to large data
sets.108 Large Wall Street firms are sprawling, multi-faceted companies that
operate in hundreds of different markets and sectors. This means that they
can see and track more information than anyone else. And at the risk of
repetition, access to data in a machine learning environment is a competitive
advantage. At he extreme, this might lead to large financial institutions tak-
ing an insurmountable dominant position that no smaller startups could chal-
lenge. This worry about artificial intelligence's benefits to the powerful has
been raised in the national security world. A recent study by the Belfer
Center at Harvard University concluded that, at least in the near term,
"bringing Al technology applications into the cyber domain will benefit
powerful nation-state actors."'" The most powerful nation states are the ac-
tors that have the scientific knowledge, research budgets, and access to in-
formation that are necessary to develop artificial intelligence systems. The
same might be said of financial institutions: large financial institutions can
hire away artificial intelligence experts from academia, industry, and their
competitors, and they have the capital to fund long-term research into artifi-
cial intelligence's applications for finance. Small startups simply do not have
this capacity. Over time, this trend might exacerbate the already sizeable
amount of concentration in the financial sector. To be sure, the long-term
consequences of artificial intelligence might be to level the playing field, not
tilt it. Machine learning algorithms are, after all, algorithms, which can be
copied and disseminated much more easily than hard assets. To the extent
that prominent artificial intelligence strategies become widely accessible and
usable by new financial firms, they may serve as a powerful equalizing fac-
107 See Anita L. Allen, Protecting One's Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L.
REv. F. 71, 71-72 (2016).
1" See Calo, supra note 31, at 424.
'" See ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 7, at 20.
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tor in financial markets. But until then, the concern about concentration in
the financial sector will persist, and may, at the extreme, create antitrust
problems.10
The data dependency problem that artificial intelligence struggles with,
and that raises issues for the financial sector, highlights a broader feature of
our financial system and the potential limitations of artificial financial intel-
ligence. Capital markets simply are not like the kinds of problems that artifi-
cial intelligence has, to date, excelled at. In cancer screening, image
recognition, and language cognition, there is a fact that the artificial intelli-
gence algorithm is attempting to discern-whether someone has cancer,
what that image depicts, what that person said. But in capital markets, there
is no similar factual counterpart. To be sure, there are factual elements of
markets, from EBITDA to market capitalization to employee numbers and
product sales (although even these can be fiddled with). But the fundamental
feature of capital markets-the allocation of value to companies-is not so
much a fact as a belief. In order to outperform the market, one needs to
understand not only the facts about a company, but also how other people
will view those facts. This is important because the very fact that a trend has
been discovered often means that the trend disappears. Momentum, small
capitalization, low volatility: all of these are market trends that have, at one
time or another, delivered market superior returns."' But once others learn
of the trend, they can quickly adopt strategies that take advantage of it, and
the very fact of their adopting those strategies eliminates the market superior
returns. This is a fundamental feature of capital markets. Indeed, it is the
underlying basis of efficient capital markets theory. Artificial intelligence is
not well-equipped to deal with these sorts of problems.
B. Overweighting
Another issue with the use of artificial financial intelligence is the po-
tential for human decisionmakers to rely too heavily on its recommenda-
tions. Given the difficulty of explaining and understanding machine learning
algorithms and the outputs they generate, financial decisionmakers, includ-
ing consumers, might simply default, without deliberation or debate, to ac-
cepting the conclusions or recommendations that the machine learning
algorithms make. Even if decisionmakers are aware of the limitations of ma-
chine learning, in the absence of clear methods for refuting or disproving the
artificial intelligence outcome, artificial intelligence may take on undue
weight in the structure of the financial industry."2
"o See Van Loo, supra note 9, at 251.
.i See Is Efficient-Market Theory Becoming More Efficient?, THE EcONOMIST, May 27,
2017, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/05/27/is-efficient-market-the-
ory-becoming-more-efficient.
112 Of course, this may be desirable if we believe that financial decisionmakers are already
biased in problematic ways. Leaning on less-biased, or less harmfully biased, machines may
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We have already discussed one way in which machine learning algo-
rithms fail: they often struggle with problems that possess non-stationary
qualities.' 3 When the fundamental nature of the market studied (for exam-
ple, the credit risk of borrowers, the stock prices of companies, or the meth-
ods of fraudsters) changes from one period to the next, the patterns and
trends that a machine learning algorithm can identify from one period's data
will not apply to the next. The non-stationary problem is particularly pro-
nounced where the mere knowledge of the trend may lead to the trend itself
disappearing, as might be the case if everyone knew that, say, the stock
market always rose 10% every year. Arbitrageurs could simply immediately
push the price of the stock up at the beginning of the year or even earlier.
The trend would then disappear.
But machine learning algorithms also struggle with other known
problems. One is "overfitting."ll 4 The goal of machine learning algorithms
is to find statistical trends in data and then generalize them so that they work
for new data. But if the algorithm generalizes in a way that incorporates
trends that are based on random factors that do not apply outside the particu-
lar data set, then it is said to overfit the data, that is, it finds trends that match
the training data but do not match the outside world. To take a simplified
version of this, imagine if a machine learning algorithm only had data on
two companies, Apple and Kodak. It might conclude that all companies that
start with "A" outperform the market, and all companies that start with "K"
go bankrupt. This would obviously fit the training data perfectly, but it likely
would not generalize to the wider world of non-Apple and non-Kodak com-
panies. The process of finding trends that do not just fit the available data,
but will also generalize well to future or outside data, is a difficult one, and
one that machine learning algorithms have a hard time doing.
Another known problem for artificial intelligence algorithms is low-
prevalence data."' The idea here is that machine learning algorithms need a
certain threshold amount of data on a given topic before being able to make
reliable predictions about it. But where certain subpopulations within a data
set are rare and different from the broader data set, machine learning algo-
rithms may simply fail to draw accurate conclusions about them. This has
been a serious problem in facial recognition algorithms: one study found that
they incorrectly classified only 1% of light-skinned men, but more than one
then be preferable. See Holger Spamann & Lars Kldhn, Justice is Less Blind, and Less Legalis-
tic, Than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 255,
255 (2016) (finding that judges' decisions were affected by irrelevant characteristics of defend-
ants but failed to mention these characteristics in their written reasoning).
113 See SUGIYAMA & KAWANABE, supra note 103, at xi.
114 See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN AP-
PROACH 705 (3rd ed. 2010); RICHARD BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PER-
SPECTIVE 142 (2008); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 33, at 684.
11 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 33, at 678-79.
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peers. Even if the algorithm explicitly could not take race into account, it
might find that other factors that correlate with race (such as names, geogra-
phy, or other information) are just as effective.9 While scholars do not have
easy solutions to these problems, they have pointed out their deeply harmful
effects.
II. ARTIFICIAL FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence has grown exponentially in recent years as more
powerful computers apply more advanced algorithms to analyze more ex-
pansive data sets. Financial institutions have increasingly deployed these ar-
tificial intelligence strategies to improve their own results. Scholars have, in
turn, begun to grapple with the thorny legal and ethical issues raised by the
incorporation of artificial intelligence into the financial world. They have
raised questions about its effects on labor, its inscrutable outputs, and its
capacity for harmful discrimination. All of these are important problems,
and ones that apply to the financial world. But at the heart of these critiques
is the assumption that artificial intelligence's dangers are rooted in its effec-
tiveness. In other words, artificial intelligence may lead to widespread job
losses, opaque financial decisions, or even discriminatory results, because it
is so capable at what it does. It is simply better at reading data and finding
patterns than humans are, and in doing so, it may create risks. But this Part
will argue that artificial financial intelligence's primary risks are not the
product of its potential to surpass human intelligence. To date, prognostica-
tions about artificial intelligence's "Cambrian explosion" are exaggerated.
Instead, the real risk from artificial financial intelligence is its capacity to
magnify human failings. If artificial intelligence ends up being incorporated
widely in the financial world, its harms will likely stem from inadequate data
input, improper usage, and feedback effects between algorithms. These
problems are dangerous and must be contained, but they are also, in a sense,
less radical than some of the concerns popular in the media today.
A. Data Dependency
A common critique of artificial intelligence is that it relies heavily on
prior data sets." As mentioned earlier, the machine learning algorithms that
have become the focus of current artificial intelligence research depend on
receiving and analyzing large amounts of data. This leads to several related
problems, some of which are specific to the financial sector, and others of
' See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 60, at 14; Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Court-
house, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 579-80 (2016) (observing that businesses' algorithms may
lead to racial discrimination by using socioeconomic factors as a proxy); Anya Prince &
Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105
IOWA L. REv. 1257 (2020).
1 See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 11, at 274-75.
2020] 355
Harvard Business Law Review
which are more general. As The Economist has written, "the world's most
valuable resource is no longer oil, but data."98
First, the use of artificial financial intelligence will cause important fi-
nancial decisions to increasingly turn not on human judgments about the
wisdom or soundness of the decision, but rather on the quality and nature of
the data that are fed into machine learning algorithms. This information is,
necessarily, determined by humans. Its effectiveness as a training tool will
thus depend heavily on the knowledge and sophistication of the employees
who decide which data to use and how to appropriately code it for machine
learning algorithms.99 iBM's Watson supercomputer, which uses machine
learning techniques and was widely billed as a potentially lifesaving cancer
detecting tool, was recently found to be issuing "unsafe and incorrect" treat-
ment recommendations. While the causes are unclear, some observers be-
lieve it is due to engineers training the software on small numbers of
hypothetical cancer cases, rather than real patient data.'" Others believe that
the machine learning algorithm simply does not do a good job at handling
rare or recurring cancers because it simply lacks data on them.'0' And the
financial world has seen similar mistakes. McKinsey reported that one Asia
Pacific bank lost $4 billion when it applied interest rate models based on
improperly entered data.102 Thus, the use of machine learning in financial
decisions raises concerns about potentially harmful inaccuracies contained in
data sets, as well as the possibility that these data sets will tend to miss out
on rare but important financial occurrences (the black swan types of events
that many investors focus on).
Second, even if the data that is used in financial applications of ma-
chine learning is not flawed, its use may create a series of related problems
in market efficiency. For one, the data may poorly reflect the nature of finan-
cial markets. Machine learning algorithms, by their very nature, aim to find
statistical trends in data and then generalize them so they work for new data.
This can be quite useful in a number of contexts, but it tends to run into
problems when the nature of the field changes over time. This is known as
98 See The World's Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE EcONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-re-
source-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
9 See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 11, at 274-75.
"n See Julie Spitzer, IBM's Watson Recommended "Unsafe and Incorrect" Cancer Treat-
ments, STAT Report Finds, BECKER'S HEALTH IT & CIO REPORT (July 25, 2018), https://www
.beckershospitalreview.com/artificial-intelligenceibm-s-watson-recommended-unsafe-and-in-
correct-cancer-treatments-stat-report-finds.html.
'0 See Daniela Hernandez & Ted Greenwald, IBM Has a Watson Dilemma, WALL ST. J.,
(Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-bet-billions-that-watson-could-improve-
cancer-treatment-it-hasnt-worked-1533961147.
102 See Philipp Harle, et al., The Future of Bank Risk Management, McKLNSEY & COM-




third of dark-skinned women.116 In the financial world, this might lead to
similar problems, such as incorrectly risk-scoring minorities, but it might
also lead to quite different ones, such as failing to identify uncommon but
significant subpopulations of a market, such as unicorn startups that have
provided enormous returns to venture capitalists."'
To be sure, machine learning experts are well aware of these problems.
They have devised ways to deal with nonstationary markets, overfitting al-
gorithms, and low-prevalence data. But these methods are imperfect and, at
most, can limit the problems, not resolve them. One researcher I spoke with
has a rule of thumb for assessing the claims of new artificial intelligence
products, something he calls the "87% rule." If an engineer or entrepreneur
claims that his artificial intelligence software can achieve accuracy rates of
higher than 87% purely by fitting data, then the researcher assumes that the
software is either overfitting or unrealistically constraining the prediction
problem in a way that does not accurately reflect real-world conditions. If,
instead, data-driven predictions provide accuracy around 87% and domain
expertise or insight are layered in to boost accuracy above that number, then
he deems it consistent with systems that have been deployed successfully in
practice. In other words, even with cutting-edge machine learning algorithms
deployed by experts in the field, the best-case result for most artificial intel-
ligence strategies still fails a significant portion of the time.
However, there are a number of reasons to believe that, once financial
firms have incorporated artificial intelligence into their systems, it will be
hard to resist its persuasiveness."' The ready availability of a sophisticated
recommendation based on millions of data points, and the relative difficulty
of scrutinizing the reasoning or rationale of the recommendation, may lead
banks and firms to overweight artificial intelligence relative to other deci-
sionmaking processes. As one doctor has said about the use of artificial in-
telligence in hospitals, "In my practice, I've often seen how any tool can
quickly become a crutch-an excuse to outsource decision making to some-
one or something else.""9 This anecdotal evidence is only bolstered by our
growing knowledge of common cognitive biases in decisionmaking.
One well-known bias in human decisionmaking is the availability
bias.120 Availability bias refers to the tendency of decisionmakers, in the face
1"6 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities
in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. Machine LEARNING REs. 1 (2018), http://pro-
ceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwinil8a/buolamwinil8a.pdf.
"' See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy,
57 B.C. L. Rev. 583 (2016).
" See Nizan Geslevich Packin, Consumer Finance and AL: The Death of Second Opin-
ions?, N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & LEG. PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2020).
"' Dhruv Khullar, A.I Could Worsen Health Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/opinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html.
2 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1477 (1998).
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of uncertainty, to use readily available facts to inform their beliefs.'2 1 This
seems like an obvious, and even rational, response to uncertainty-when we
do not know something, we use the facts we have at hand. But the result of
this natural instinct is that, where the availability bias is present, deci-
sionmakers tend to overweight the representativeness of easily recallable in-
formation, and underweight more complex or distant information.12 2 This
bias is amplified when individuals lack sufficient information to form inde-
pendent conclusions about an issue.'23 In the financial world, where uncer-
tainty is an unavoidable feature of the industry, the availability of an easily
accessible recommendation, provided by an algorithm and not susceptible to
ready refutation, might well cause people to rely excessively on the al-
gorithm over independently reasoned deliberation. They might simply de-
fault to the algorithmically generated output.
Another well-studied cognitive bias is the anchoring effect.124 The
anchoring effect refers to people's tendency to be swayed by initial reference
points, or anchors.125 The classic example is in housing prices: when people
are asked how much they believe a house is worth, their answer will depend
heavily on how much they are told the seller is asking for it.126 The result of
setting an anchor is that decisionmakers will tend to use it as a reference
point, and then make adjustments from that point, typically departing from it
in only incremental and minimal ways.'27 The application to artificial finan-
cial intelligence is clear. If an algorithm provides a recommended value for
an asset, or a risk score for a potential borrower, it may serve as a strong
anchor, informing and biasing subsequent discussion. Even if the ultimate
decisionmaker is aware of the flaws and limitations of machine learning, the
very process of providing a number or calculation will affect future
decisions.
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, artificial financial intelligence
may take on undue weight in financial decisions because of a phenomenon
known as "herd behavior." 28 Herd behavior is a relatively intuitive concept:
121 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (1983); Jolls et al.,
supra note 120, at 1477.
122 Jolls et al., supra note 120, at 1477.
123 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. Rev. 683, 685-87 (1999).
124 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347, 362 (1996);
Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchor-
ing-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987); Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias,
Moral Hazard, and Situational Pressure, 9 OHIo ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 379, 394
(2015).
125 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 124, at 362.
126 See Northcraft & Neale, supra note 124, at 87-90.
127 Id.
'" See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.
EcON. REV. 465, 465 (1990); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 124, at 356.
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when people see other people taking an action, or refraining from doing so,
they often imitate it, particularly if they have incentives to avoid diverging
too much from the status quo.129 It is not, strictly speaking, irrational to do
so. Individuals in management positions are often more likely to be punished
for taking an unusual risk or action than for a taking a common one, even if
they both turn out equally poorly.130 After all, if they are simply doing what
everyone else is doing, it is hard to argue that they misbehaved. But if they
are underperforming their peers in material ways, then their reputation will
likely suffer. In the world of artificial financial intelligence, it is easy to
imagine that following the recommendation of a machine learning algorithm
would quickly become the low-risk, reputation-protecting action. If a deci-
sionmaker follows an artificial intelligence-based recommendation, they can
deflect blame to the algorithm itself. On the other hand, if they intentionally
refuse to accept the artificial intelligence-based recommendation, then they
will have some explaining to do if their divergent opinion turns out to be
incorrect.
To be sure, all of these biases are avoidable with sufficient care, dili-
gence, and monitoring. Much of cognitive psychology is concerned with
finding ways to debias individuals and correct for these errors. But the biases
highlight another important feature of artificial financial intelligence: how-
ever much we may want to eliminate human interaction or interference with
artificial intelligence, it ultimately creeps back in, often in unexpected
places. Financial decisionmakers need to review artificial intelligence rec-
ommendations based on their own knowledge about fundamental changes in
markets, changes that might not be well reflected in prior data sets. Financial
engineers must review artificial intelligence for overfitting problems. But in
the absence of easily understandable results, decisionmakers may simply de-
fer to the artificial intelligence algorithm, either out of ignorance, risk aver-
sion, or simply inertia. The problem here is not so much the algorithms
themselves, but our trust in them.
C. Echo Effects
Finally, artificial financial intelligence may lead to unexpected feed-
back effects between competing artificial intelligence systems. This is a
well-known problem in the world of high-frequency trading.'3' After the so-
called "Flash Crash" of 2010, in which the Dow Jones plummeted 1000
points in a matter of minutes, many observers blamed high-frequency traders
129 See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 128, at 465.
130 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 124, at 356.
131 See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VADo. L. REV. 1607, 1617-31 (2015); Pankaj K. Jain et al., Does High-Frequency Trading
Increase Systemic Risk?, 31 J. FrN. Micrs. 1, 1 (2016); Frank J. Fabozzi et al., High-Frequency
Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV. FuTuREs MKTS. 7, 9-10 (2011).
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for increasing the speed and volatility of markets.132 And while the likeli-
hood of echo effects between artificial intelligence systems may be strongest
in capital markets, where stock prices depend heavily on the decisions of
other players within the market, they may also appear in other areas of fi-
nance, such as credit scoring, fraud prevention, and strategic advising.
One concern is that decisions made by artificial financial intelligence
systems may not truly be independent of one another. In other words, if
financial institutions are all deploying similar machine learning algorithms
on similar data, they may reach similar results. When humans make deci-
sions, they at least nominally are doing so on their own (even if their deci-
sions may be affected by the decisions of their peers). Not so for artificial
intelligence. It is much simpler to copy an algorithm than it is to copy a
human brain. As one scholar has written in the national security context:
When China stole the blueprints and R&D data for America's F-35
fighter aircraft . .. it likely shaved years off the development time-
line for a Chinese F-35 competitor-but China didn't actually ac-
quire a modem jet fighter or the immediate capability to make one
.... But when a country steals the code for a cyberweapons [sic],
it has stolen not only the blueprints, but also the tool itself-and it
can reproduce that tool at near zero-marginal cost.133
If two competitors base their artificial intelligence strategies on the same
algorithms, they will likely reach the same conclusions about relevant
problems. This may well amplify both the speed and size of market swings,
as financial institutions increasingly adopt broadly consistent views of the
market.
Another concern is that, even if financial institutions do not adopt the
same artificial intelligence strategies, their separate strategies may still lead
to worrying feedback effects. One way this might occur is by machine learn-
ing algorithms incorporating the results of other machine learning algorithms
into their data sets. For example, if one financial institution's artificial intelli-
gence system concludes that a borrower should not be given a loan, or
should only be given a loan at a certain interest rate, then that result may
filter down into the data sets that are used to train other financial institutions'
artificial intelligence systems. A loan rejection might, then, lead to more
loan rejections. This could happen even more quickly in liquid markets like
stock exchanges, where artificial intelligence strategies depend on quickly
identifying and acting on changes in the market. So even if investment com-
132 See Yadav, supra note 131, at 1628-29; Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The
Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market (May 5, 2014), https://www.cftc
.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce-flashcrash03
14.pdf.
133 See Greg Allen, America's Plan for Stopping Cyberattacks Is Dangerously Weak, Vox




panies are using different artificial intelligence systems, the results of each
artificial intelligence system will affect the others. The overall outcome of
these interactions is uncertain, but, as before, might lead to more sudden or
volatile market movements.'3
Finally, another concern, and one that is written about widely in the
artificial intelligence industry, is the possibility of adversarial artificial in-
telligence.13 5 Adversarial artificial intelligence (or machine learning) refers
to the intentional manipulation of input data in order to fool artificial intelli-
gence systems or lead them to unintended results.'36 If an adversary or com-
petitor knows how a given artificial intelligence system works, it can often
devise strategies that lead the system to malfunction. One way to do this is
by inserting poisoned data into the system. A good example of this is image
recognition in self-driving cars. Researchers have shown that by simply put-
ting a few black and white stickers on a stop sign, they can trick machine
learning algorithms into misclassifying it 100% of the time, despite the fact
that the stop sign would still be readily identifiable to any human. 137 As more
of the financial world adopts artificial intelligence algorithms into their busi-
ness strategies, the potential for adversarial strategies rises exponentially.
For example, if a criminal learns that a bank's algorithm identifies transac-
tions as fraudulent only when certain patterns of behavior occur, he can sim-
ply avoid the behaviors that trigger a fraud alert. Or if borrowers know the
algorithm by which lenders rate their credit risk, they can simply manipulate
the relevant variables to ensure they are viewed as creditworthy. Perhaps
even more worrisome is the possibility that a competitor might manipulate
stock markets based on knowledge of how other financial institutions' in-
vestment algorithms work. Cybersecurity is already a major worry for finan-
cial institutions. This worry only increases as algorithms perform more and
more of the significant actions present in financial markets.
HI. REGULATING ARTIFICIAL FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial financial intelligence raises a number of potential concerns,
from its perpetuation of historical trends, to its effect on human decision-
making, to its capacity to magnify and exacerbate volatility. But the mere
possibility of harm, without more, does not suggest hat we need new laws,
or even new regulatory approaches. To justify new laws, we need to know
that current laws are not working. To date, this threshold has not been met.
The financial industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the
13 See Tom C. W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567 (2014).
13 See Calo, supra note 31, at 419-20; Tom C. W. Lin, Financial Weapons of War, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1377 (2016).
'36 See J. D. Tygar, Adversarial Machine Learning, 15 IEEE INTEfRNET COMPUTING 4, 4
(2011).
137 See Kevin Eykholt et al., Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual
Classification, arXiv 1707.08945, Apr. 2018, https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945.
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United States, and the kaleidoscope of regulators and regulations cover
nearly every activity that a financial institution could conceivably think of
doing. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authority to protect
consumers from unfair or abusive practices in the financial markets, and it
has been proactive in monitoring new financial technologies.'38 The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) is tasked with protecting investors
and promoting fair, efficient capital markets, and it has itself adopted ma-
chine learning methods to monitor markets."' The Financial Stability Over-
sight Council monitors the stability of the nation's financial system and
responds to emerging risks, and it regularly reports on the effects of auto-
mated trading systems and financial technologies.'4 Artificial financial intel-
ligence has yet to be shown to fall into gaps in this framework.
That said, this does not mean that current laws are perfectly attuned to
the risks of artificial intelligence. It also does not mean that new uses of
artificial intelligence will not render current financial regulation ineffective.
If anything, it is hoped that this Article serves to highlight to bankers,
policymakers, judges, and academics the importance of artificial financial
intelligence as a field, and to highlight the need for thoughtful discussions
both of how it is being used and how it should be used.
In particular, regulators should keep in mind three broad goals in adopt-
ing policies for addressing artificial financial intelligence: ensuring fairness,
facilitating efficiency, and promoting stability. These goals are not particu-
larly novel. They are the hallmarks of financial regulation, and they form the
backbone of most statutory frameworks in the industry.141 They do, however,
have different valences when applied to the world of artificial financial intel-
ligence. This Part will discuss the ways in which financial regulators should
use their existing authority to ensure that artificial financial intelligence does
not undermine the free and fair functioning of financial markets.
A. Artificial Fairness
First, regulators should review artificial financial intelligence to ensure
that it is being implemented in a way that treats consumers and investors
fairly. Fairness here is meant to be an inclusive term. Fair markets are ones
that are free of discrimination,142 abusive practices,143 and fraud.' These are
broad and open-ended concepts, but they are essential underpinnings of our
138 See Van Loo, supra note 11, at 532-33.
1' See Scott W. Bauguess, Acting Dir. and Acting Chief Economist, DERA, Champagne
Keynote Address at OpRisk North America 2017: The Role of Big Data, Machine Learning,
and AI in Assessing Risks: a Regulatory Perspective (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speechlbauguess-big-data-ai.
140 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://
home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2018AnnualReport.pdf.
"' See William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J. L. Bus.
& FIN. 159 (2018).
142 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 60, at 16-18.
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financial system. More importantly, they have been given tangible and well-
defined meaning by regulators tasked with overseeing the industry.
In terms of discrimination, regulating artificial financial intelligence
will require measures to prevent algorithms from discriminating against par-
ticular disfavored or minority groups. There is already ample legislative au-
thority to act on this front. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits
lenders from discriminating against potential borrowers on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age. 14 The Fair Hous-
ing Act prohibits banks from considering similar characteristics when mak-
ing mortgage decisions.146 Regulation B prohibits discrimination in credit
scoring systems.147 The key here will be identifying when discrimination is
occurring on prohibited grounds. Given the complex and, in many cases,
inscrutable operations of artificial intelligence algorithms, regulators will
need to develop methods for auditing financial algorithms and identifying
root causes.'4 After all, there are many other variables that are correlated
with race, sex, religion, and age, and artificial intelligence algorithms might
well identify those variables and use them in impermissible ways, even if
they are prevented from directly using the prohibited characteristics in
decisions.
Promoting fairness in artificial financial intelligence will also require
greater efforts to ensure that financial institutions properly disclose the na-
ture of artificial intelligence risks to investors. These disclosures must be
both accurate and understandable. Again, there is ample legislative authority
for regulators to act here. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits
manipulation, deception and fraud in connection with the sale of securi-
ties.149 Rule lOb-5 prohibits individuals from making untrue statements of
material fact or omitting material facts necessary to make statements not
misleading in connection with the sale of securities.150 The Investment Com-
pany Act requires financial institutions to disclose ample information about
investment policies.'"' The Investment Advisers Act requires financial advi-
sors to give suitable investment advice to consumers, taking into account the
client's financial situation, investment experience, and investment objec-
tives.'52 Regulators should use this broad legislative authority to set forth
143 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor - Jungle
Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. REG. 345 (1995).
'" See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 761-62 (2009).
145 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
'"42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2012).
14' Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2011).
14 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 60, at 28.
149 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
15o 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2008).
"' See Securities and Exchange Commission, Registration Form Used by Open-End Man-
agement Investment Companies, 63 FED. REG. 13,916, 13,917 (Mar. 23, 1998).
152 See Rules and Regulations, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 17 C.F.R. § 275 (2012).
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clear guidelines on what sorts of artificial financial intelligence products are
appropriate for investors, how those products can be marketed, and what
disclosures must be made.
Regulators will also need to conduct regular reviews of artificial finan-
cial intelligence to monitor for potentially harmful effects on consumers,
such as excessive interest rates or improper financial advice.'53 Currently,
too little information is available about how financial institutions are using
artificial intelligence, and how artificial intelligence is affecting financial
markets. In 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote an open letter to financial
regulators asking them how they were responding to algorithmic finance,
including what they were doing to combat discrimination, how they were
overseeing fair lending laws, and whether they are conducting analyses of
the impact of algorithms on borrowers.15 4 These are basic questions which
should be easily answerable. The fact that they are not suggests that regula-
tors either are not acting to the full extent of their statutory authority, or that
they are not being forthcoming about their priorities and procedures.
Ensuring the fairness of artificial financial intelligence will thus require
a searching analysis of the machine learning process, from algorithm design,
to data gathering, to implementation procedures. Because artificial intelli-
gence is by its very nature difficult to understand and explain, the burden on
regulators will be high."' It may require regulators to hire experts on ma-
chine learning, or deploy machine learning themselves.5 6 But the benefits
are also high. If private and public sector actors can do it right, they could
greatly improve the fairness of financial markets.
B. Artificial Efficiency
Second, financial regulators must be mindful of artificial intelligence's
effects on the efficiency of financial markets. If artificial financial intelli-
gence leads to the mispricing of stocks, or asset bubbles, or a reduction in
competition, or higher fees, then regulators must be ready to respond. Again,
there is ample authority for them to do so. Indeed, promoting efficient mar-
kets is at the core of financial regulators' mission. The SEC's stated mission
is to "maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets."5 7 The Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission's ("CFTC") mission is to "foster open, transpar-
153 See Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Fintech Era
(NBER, Working Paper No. 25942, 2019); Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Mon-
itoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1622 (2019).
154 Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (June 10, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/mediadoc/2019.6.10%20Letter
%20to%20Regulators%20on%20Fintech%20FINAL.pdf.
"' But not insurmountably so. See Kroll et al., supra note 88.
156 See Bauguess, supra note 139.
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f).
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ent, competitive and financially sound markets.""' The Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority's ("FINRA") mission is to "promote market
integrity."'
In many ways, artificial intelligence might be expected to improve effi-
ciency in financial markets. After all, machine learning algorithms are being
deployed for the very purpose of improving the speed and accuracy of fraud
detection, risk management, and investment decisions.'6 The great advan-
tage of machine learning strategies is that they can find unnoticed, but mate-
rial, patterns within data and then make predictions based on those
patterns.' Financial institutions have strong incentives to make sure that
their algorithms work accurately and reliably.
But the mere fact that artificial intelligence algorithms are intended to
improve efficiency, or even that financial institutions have incentives to en-
sure that they do so, does not mean that these algorithms will achieve their
intentions, or that in achieving them, they will not create unexpected conse-
quences elsewhere. History is littered with examples of algorithms acting
unexpectedly, or causing unexpected harm.162 Regulators must therefore be
attuned to the mechanisms by which artificial intelligence algorithms might
create inefficiency in financial markets.
Although a thorough assessment of the causes of inefficiency within
artificial financial intelligence would require a close analysis of the source
code at issue, a few plausible risks are readily apparent. The first has to do
with macro trends in the economy. As discussed earlier, artificial financial
intelligence relies for its efficacy on data sets that, necessarily, involve his-
torical information.163 But if the historical trend that the information reflects
is itself undesirable or unsustainable, then artificial intelligence algorithms
based on it might reinforce or strengthen the trend.Y" They might, for exam-
ple, pile into an industry that had experienced rapid growth in recent months,
or rapidly exit an industry that had experienced a slump. Indeed, so-called
momentum trading is a popular strategy among quantitative funds.65 Again,
this might be a good thing if it leads to assets more quickly reflecting their
objective value. But it might equally be the result of a poorly designed
algorithm.
" See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COIMISSION, FY 2018 AGENCY FINANCIAL RE-
PORT 5 (Nov. 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/system/files/2019/04/24/2018afr.pdf.
'" Our Mission, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/our-mission. (last visited May 14,
2020).
* See supra Part LB.
161 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 33, at 684-88.
'
62 
See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
63 See supra Part I.B.
16 See Robin Wigglesworth, Volatility: How "Algos" Changed the Rhythm of the Market,
FINANCIAL TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/fdclc064-1142-11e9-a581-4ff784
04524e.
6' See Matt Prewitt, High-Frequency Trading: Should Regulators Do More, 19 MICH.
ThLECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 131, 135 (2012).
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Another form of inefficiency might arise not so much from unintended
actions as intentional cooperation. Artificial intelligence algorithms increase
the risk that firms will collude to raise prices, even in the absence of a for-
mal agreement to do so.'66 This presents a serious antitrust risk-indeed, the
Federal Trade Commission is so worried about this problem that it has held
hearings on the topic.'7 Imagine, for example, that an artificial intelligence
algorithm deployed by banks to set mortgage rates learns that every time it
lowers its rate, its competitor does as well, or, potentially worse, every time
it raises its rate, its competitor does as well. The interaction of these algo-
rithms might well lead to higher prices for all. This is not merely hypotheti-
cal. As early as 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found that airlines
used a joint computerized booking system to set collusive ticket prices.'68
More recently, the DOJ has charged Amazon sellers with using algorithm-
based software to engage in unlawful price fixing.16 9
Other forms of inefficiency might be even more pernicious. Opportu-
nistic market actors could potentially exploit knowledge of the workings of
other firms' artificial intelligence algorithms to trigger unexpected behav-
ior.7 0 As mentioned before, researchers have worried for some time about
the potential of adversarial AI to insert poisoned data into artificial intelli-
gence systems in order to defeat their intended functioning.17' This type of
strategy has obvious applications in the world of finance. Hedge funds with
short positions on a stock might try to cause other firms' algorithms to trig-
ger sell orders.'72 Fraudsters might intentionally change their patterns of be-
havior in order to avoid fraud detection algorithms."' Hackers might attempt
to create financial panic by spreading false information on social media plat-
forms or news sites. 14 All of these sorts of behavior could introduce new and
dangerous forms of inefficiency into markets, and regulators must be ready
' See Kuhn & Tadelis, Algorithmic Collusion (2017).
6See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IS-
SUES OF ALGORITHMS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS (Federal Trade
Commission 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/algorithmic-collusion.
'" See Antonio Capobianco, Algorithms and Collusion, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (2017).
"' See Azriel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When
Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2017).
"o See, e.g., Adam Janofsky, AI Could Make Cyberattacks More Dangerous, Harder to
Detect, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-could-make-cyberattacks-
more-dangerous-harder-to-detect-1542128667.
17 See supra Part I.C.
' For empirical evidence of hedge fund manipulation of stock prices, see Itzhak Ben-
David et al., Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?, 68 J. FIN. 2383 (2013).
"' See Mary Frances Zeager et al., Adversarial Learning in Credit Card Fraud Detection,
2017 Sys. AND INFo. ENGINEERING DESIGN SYMP. 112, https://ieeexplore.iee.org/abstract/doc-
ument/7937699.
74 See Michelle Cantos, Breaking the Bank: Weakness in Financial AI Applications,




to identify and respond to them before they mature into more general market
failures.
C. Artificial Risk
Finally, regulators must monitor artificial intelligence's effects on sys-
temic risk. Observers in a wide array of areas, from national security to labor
to elections, have discussed the ways in which artificial intelligence might
lead to major shifts in systemic stability. Financial regulators must be simi-
larly wary of artificial financial intelligence's effects on the stability of mar-
kets. Doing so will turn primarily on identifying the pathways through which
artificial financial intelligence could create contagion among financial actors
and then acting to increase the resilience of participants and systems to mar-
ket shocks.
Assessing the systemic risk of artificial financial intelligence requires a
careful understanding of the uses of artificial intelligence and the ways in
which it is changing the nature of industry risks."' We have already seen that
artificial financial intelligence might lead to more volatile markets by, for
example, leading to faster and larger transaction volumes.'6 It might also
lead to more financial bubbles, or bigger ones, if it turns out that artificial
intelligence algorithms tend to pile into "fashionable" market trends.77
Other risks turn on the artificial intelligence industry itself. For example, if
financial institutions rely heavily on third-party providers for artificial intel-
ligence algorithms or the data used to drive those algorithms, then those
third-party providers might well become systemically important themselves,
despite their non-financial focus.178 Additionally, if artificial financial intelli-
gence leads financial institutions to focus on new variables or sectors (such
as social media posts or browsing activity), then those new variables could
suddenly become the source of interconnectedness, and thus risk.179
It just so happens that debt, one of the centerpieces for artificial finan-
cial intelligence today, is also a crucial factor in assessing the degree of
systemic risk within the market.'I" Debt, after all, was at the heart of the last
financial crisis and is one of the primary foci of many systemic risk regula-
tors today.'8 ' If financial institutions turn increasingly to artificial intelli-
See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS, at
29-31 (2017).
"6 See supra Part II.C.
" Id.
" See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 175, at 29.
179 Cf id. at 31 (discussing how widespread adoption of algorithms may uncover intercon-
nections among variables that were previously thought to be unrelated).
1so Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33
HARV. J. L. & PUB. Poit'Y 671, 677 (2010). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008) (discussing the definition of systemic risk).
'"' See Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 1, 1 (2014)
("Most observers agree that the excessive debt or leverage of systemically important financial
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gence to make decisions related to creditworthiness and loan activity, then
the risk profile of this sector will turn heavily on the inner workings of the
algorithms. As a result, systemic stability regulators will need to better un-
derstand the ways in which artificial financial intelligence affects debt mar-
kets and risk assessments.
Again, regulators have ample authority to act here. The Dodd-Frank Act
created an entire department, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to
monitor systemic risk. 182 Its mission is three-fold: first, to identify risks to
the financial stability of the United States; second, to promote market disci-
pline by eliminating expectations that the government will shield financial
institutions from losses in the event of failure; and third, to respond to
emerging threats to the stability of the financial system."' Artificial financial
intelligence seems to fit squarely within the third category-it is an emerg-
ing risk, not a current one, to systemic stability. But in the future, if it be-
comes more widely adopted, it might well shift to the first category.
Given the regulatory ambit of the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
and its broad-ranging mission to police systemic stability, statutory authority
is unlikely to be an issue in regulating artificial financial intelligence's sys-
temic risk. Competence and capacity, however, will be. Even within the pri-
vate sector, there is a scarcity of expertise in machine learning fields.184 The
public sector suffers even more from this lack of experts and resources.1'
And without experts capable of understanding the workings of artificial in-
telligence algorithms, government regulators will struggle to monitor sys-
temic risk within the sector.18 6 One important step here would be to give
regulators the ability to stress-test artificial financial intelligence systems,
allowing them to provide synthetic inputs to a system and analyze the
properties of the outputs. But doing so will first require regulators to gain a
deep knowledge of machine learning and artificial intelligence systems,
something they do not currently possess.1 7
institutions (SIFIs) was a central reason why the housing crash of 2007-2009 led to a
recession.").
182 See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 OH. ST. L. J. 1087, 1113-15 (2015).
183 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5322
(2012).
" See Bernard Marr, The AI Skills Crisis and How to Close the Gap, FORBEs, June 25,
2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/06/25/the-ai-skills-crisis-and-how-to-
close-the-gap/#57fa30be31f3.
185 Cf Michael Kratsios, Why the US Needs a Strategy for Al, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2019)
https://www.wired.com/story/a-national-strategy-for-ai (discussing the need for increased gov-
ernment focus on artificial intelligence to maintain a national competitive edge).
186 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 175, at 34.
18 Indeed, the need for greater machine learning expertise within government has been a
mainstay of many recent proposals to improve governance of the AI industry. See Cary Cog-
lianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-
Learning Era, 105 GEO. L. J. 1147, 1216 (2017); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Trans-
parency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 30 (2019); Andrew Tutt, An FDA
for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 114 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2018).
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D. The Role of Self-Regulation
This Part has focused primarily on what regulators can do to minimize
the risks and harms of artificial financial intelligence, but there is also much
that financial institutions themselves can do. In fact, it is likely that self-
regulation will be significantly more effective at cabining artificial intelli-
gence's risks than regulatory enforcement actions could ever be.'" Regula-
tors are, by their very nature, outsiders. They do not know the inner
workings of financial institutions nearly as well as insiders do, and they do
not have the levels of expertise in machine learning that are available to the
private sector. This means that, for artificial financial intelligence to fulfill
its goal of making intelligent decisions, we will need bankers, engineers, and
computer scientists to be cognizant of the broader social goals of finance.
We cannot simply rely on regulators to step in to prevent financial institu-
tions from taking risky actions-financial institutions themselves will need
to be the primary gatekeepers of artificial intelligence.
What might self-regulation look like in artificial financial intelligence?
Some general principles are clear. Bankers will need to consider the fairness
of the artificial financial intelligence systems they develop, whether they
may harm the efficiency of markets, and whether they might jeopardize sys-
temic stability. They will need to be mindful of the data they use, the outputs
they receive, the actions they take, and the monitoring systems they have in
place. They may well need to go further and cooperate with other actors in
the industry to ensure that their systems do not interact in dangerous ways.
But self-regulation must be more than just platitudes about corporate
social responsibility.189 It should also include efforts that look more like hard
law. An illustrative example is FINRA.'9 FINRA is a self-regulatory body
for brokerage firms formed in 2007.191 But despite being an industry-run
8s Google itself has recognized the need for guiding principles for artificial intelligence in
the private sector. In April 2018, Sergey Brin, Google's founder, wrote in a letter to sharehold-
ers that "[t]he new spring in artificial intelligence is the most significant development in
computing in my lifetime" but that "such powerful tools also bring with them new questions
and responsibilities," such as how they will affect employment, fairness, and safety. SERGEY
BRIN, 2017 FOUNDERS' LETTER (2018), https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2017/index
.html. In June 2018, Google CEO Sundar Pichai published an essay on Google's principles for
Al, setting forth the objectives that guide Google's artificial intelligence strategies. See Sundar
Pichai, Al at Google: Our Principles (June. 7, 2018), https:/Iblog.google/technology/ai/ai-prin-
ciples/. In February 2019, the company went further, issuing a white paper arguing that gov-
ernments need to take action to govern artificial intelligence. GOOGLE, PERSPECTVES ON
ISSUES tIN Al GOVERNANCE (2018), https://ai.google/static/documents/perspectives-on-issues-
in-ai-governance.pdf. But see Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U.
CIN. L. Rev. 573 (2018).
189 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Econom-
ics Perspective, 17 CHAPMAN L. REv. 331 (2014); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams,
Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005).
19 See generally Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 101 (2014).
- Id. at 104.
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organization, it does much that has the look and feel of law. Broker-dealers
are obligated to join the body.'92 It writes standards of conduct that bind its
members.'93 It has the power to discipline members for violating its rules,
including the ability to exclude brokers from practicing in the industry.194
This sort of organization-a self-regulatory organization with teeth-would
be helpful in establishing the rules of the road for artificial financial intelli-
gence. Industry groups might, for example, develop a set of best practices on
cybersecurity, machine learning algorithms, and data set development. In the
end, these sorts of private sector endeavors are essential to ensure that artifi-
cial financial intelligence leads to fair, efficient, and stable outcomes.
Some of this work is already taking place within the technology indus-
try.'9 5 Computer science engineers are increasingly incorporating social
goals into their machine learning guides, and they are actively looking for
ways to improve artificial intelligence algorithms' ability to take into account
other external values.9 6 One prominent example is TensorFlow.'19 Tensor-
Flow is a machine learning system originally developed by Google for inter-
nal use but which was eventually released to the public on an open-source
basis.19 8 Its training modules now include the following note:
As a modeler and developer, think about how this data is used and
the potential benefits and harm a model's predictions can cause. A
model like this could reinforce societal biases and disparities. Is a
feature relevant to the problem you want to solve or will it intro-
duce bias?'"
It then includes a link to a longer discussion of "machine learning fairness,"
with a set of recommended readings. While the efficacy of these warnings in
a technical training setting might be questionable, it provides a good exam-
ple of the ways in which computer scientists are trying to incorporate
broader goals into their algorithms. Financial institutions might similarly
work on introducing broader situational awareness into the engineers and
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IV. OBJECTIONS
This Article has argued that artificial financial intelligence poses a
threat to free and fair financial markets, not because of its capacity to exceed
human intelligence, but because of its capacity to exacerbate human error.
Because of its reliance on potentially inaccurate datasets, its biasing effect
on human decisionmakers, and its unpredictable interactions with other algo-
rithms, artificial financial intelligence could lead to harmful changes in how
the financial industry works. Regulators, thus, must be vigilant in ensuring
that financial institutions maintain efficient, fair, and stable markets.
These arguments, however, are not uncontroversial. In fact, they run
counter to three powerful theoretical strands in artificial intelligence scholar-
ship. I will refer to these strands as the mirror critique, the balance critique,
and the precautionary critique, but I might just as accurately have referred to
them as the cynical view, the optimist's view, and the pessimist's view. This
Part will briefly explain what these critiques are, identify how they differ
from the views asserted in this Article, and offer a few thoughts on why I
find them unpersuasive.
A. The Mirror Critique
One standard response to artificial intelligence today is to claim that
there is nothing particularly new about it.200 Artificial intelligence may use
different algorithms from other programs, or have greater processing capaci-
ties, but at heart, it is simply another form of computer code. And like all
computer code, it has flaws. More specifically, the flaws of computer code
mirror those of its creators.2 01 If the programmer who writes the code is risk-
prone, unthoughtful, or irrational, then the algorithms will reflect that. We
should not be surprised, then, that machine leaming algorithms are biased,
overweight certain data, or respond unpredictably to changes. So, too, do
humans.202
Proponents of the mirror critique might well agree with the premise of
this Article that artificial financial intelligence has flaws in relation to its
problematic reliance on faulty data. But they would disagree that these flaws
are unique or new, or that they require special, tailored responses from regu-
2" See Dan Patterson, Why AI is Nothing New, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 22, 2019), https://
www.techrepublic.com/article/why-ai-is-nothing-new/; Richard Socher, AI Isn't Dangerous,
But Human Bias Is, WoRLD EcoN. F. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/
01/ai-isn-t-dangerous-but-human-bias-is/.
201 See Jayne Williamson-Lee, How Machines Inherit Their Creators' Biases, MEDIUM
(July 9, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/ai-doesnt-have-to-be-conscious-to-be-harmful-
385dl43bd311; Jeff Cockrell, A.I. is Only Human, CHI. BooTH REv., Summer 2019, https://
review.chicagobooth.eduleconomics/2019/article/ai-only-human; Kate Crawford, Artificial In-
telligence's White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMEs (Jun. 25, 2016).
20 For a recent summary of the many ways in which humans exhibit behavioral biases as
a matter of psychology, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013).
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lators. If the flaws are precisely the ones that we worry about with human
decisionmakers, then there is nothing special about artificial intelligence,
and regulators should simply maintain their current strategies of monitoring
and sanctioning bad actions when they take place.
Before responding to this critique, it is perhaps worthwhile to note
some areas of agreement. This Article agrees that the "revolutionary" nature
of artificial intelligence is often exaggerated.203 This Article agrees that arti-
ficial intelligence's flaws are related to the flaws in human psychology.204
This Article agrees that we should not expect artificial intelligence to elimi-
nate human error.2 05 All of these are important observations about the nature
of artificial intelligence today, and they form part of this Article's core argu-
ment. At the same time, the mirror critique is misguided in several ways.
First, while it may be true on a trivial level that the failures of artificial
intelligence can be categorized in similar ways as the failures of human in-
telligence, there are also important ways in which the failures are different.
Most legal problems today, if described at a sufficiently high level of gener-
ality, can be shown to be the product of similar problems. The concept of
negligence in tort law bears striking similarities to the concept of fiduciary
duties in corporate law, but this does not mean that they are the same thing
or, more importantly, that we should treat tort law and corporate law the
same. Similarly, while the general categories of problem are the same be-
tween human decisionmakers and artificial intelligence algorithms, the na-
ture and effects of these problems differ. Some of the differences are quite
simple: artificial intelligence algorithms can process information much more
quickly than humans can, and thus we might expect that artificial financial
intelligence might lead to errors propagating and spreading at higher rates.
Other differences relate to the nature of decisionmaking in these systems: as
described before, adversarial artificial intelligence demonstrates just how
susceptible these algorithms are to intentional manipulation, and in ways that
that most humans would spot.206 Certainly, there are also ways to fool
humans. But the methods are different. Thus, even if we do believe that
artificial intelligence's flaws are also human flaws, we must also recognize
that these flaws look very different when an algorithm is behind them.
A second way in which the mirror critique is unpersuasive is that there
are some risks from artificial financial intelligence that seem to exist in an
entirely new category. One of the risks that this Article has identified is the
interaction between human decisionmakers and artificial financial intelli-
gence. In other words, one of the problems with financial institutions imple-
menting machine learning strategies is that human decisionmakers may rely
too heavily on the recommendations these algorithms give.207 Studies have
203 See supra Part H.B.204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See supra Part II.C.
207 See supra Part II.B.
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shown, for example, that people tend to believe that algorithms are superior
to humans in making financial decisions.208 Thus, if artificial financial intel-
ligence proliferates, it may create problems related to overweighting by
human bankers. This suggests that artificial intelligence will introduce a new
risk that simply does not exist in traditional finance.
Third, setting aside objections relating to the extent of the harm and the
nature of the harm, even if we concede that the categories of problem within
artificial financial intelligence and traditional finance are the same, this does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they should both be regulated in
similar ways. The mere fact that two phenomena share similar risks does not
suggest that they will respond to similar regulatory interventions. Even
within human communities, we know that groups can respond quite differ-
ently to government action.209 The imposition of fines for undesirable behav-
ior might cause some groups to reduce the incidence of that behavior but
cause other groups to increase the incidence of that behavior.2 10 Similarly,
crafting tailored regulation to reduce the risks of artificial financial intelli-
gence likely requires different approaches than those traditionally used. As
an initial matter, simply understanding the risks of particular artificial intelli-
gence algorithms requires different kinds of knowledge-regulators need
expertise in computer science, neural networks, and data science, things that
they have not traditionally focused on.2 11 Similarly, the interventions needed
to reduce the risks of artificial intelligence are likely quite different than
traditional interventions in finance. Simple disclosure obligations may not be
sufficient for machine learning algorithms-source code is notoriously com-
plex and inscrutable.212 Backtesting, dynamic testing, and zero knowledge
proofs (some of the proposals for analyzing machine learning algorithms)
are more promising, and they require different sorts of action from regula-
tors.2 13 All of this is to suggest that even if artificial financial intelligence
presents similar categories of risk, the regulatory actions necessary to reduce
these risks are new and require specialized knowledge.
208 See Packin, supra note 118.
20 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Janice Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social
Groups, 42 L. & Soc. Inquiry 60 (2017).
210 See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUo. 1
(2000).
211 See supra Part III.C.
212 See Kroll et al., supra note 88, at 638 ("Perhaps the most obvious approach is to
disclose a system's source code, but this is at best a partial solution to the problem of accounta-
bility for automated decisions. The source code of computer systems is illegible to nonexperts.
In fact, even experts often struggle to understand what software code will do, as inspecting
source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer program will behave.").
213 Id. at 668.
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B. The Precautionary Critique
Proponents of the precautionary critique take a different approach.2 14
They assert that the risks of artificial intelligence are not just new, they are
existential. They note the dramatic improvements in artificial intelligence's
capacities in just the last few years and argue that we should assume that
these improvements will continue into the future.215 As a result, artificial
intelligence could potentially, in the very near future, replace many, if not
most, human tasks and lead to dramatic increases in inequality.216 Thus,
these Al pessimists assert, we need wide-ranging and intrusive new regula-
tions to assure that artificial intelligence does not cause systemic harm to our
economy and society.217 Another related strand of this critique claims that,
even if artificial intelligence does not present a risk of surpassing the broad
cognitive capacities of humans currently, it may do so in the future. And if
that is the case, then regulators need to address these future harms now, not
wait for them to materialize. In other words, they should adopt something
akin to a precautionary principle: regulators should take anticipatory action
to protect people from plausible harm even before firm empirical evidence
of that harm materializes.21 1
214 Notable proponents of the precautionary critique include Elon Musk (who has claimed
that artificial intelligence is "potentially more dangerous than nukes"), Stephen Hawking (who
has said that "the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human
race."), and, sometimes, Bill Gates (who has said that "a few decades after [machines are
doing most jobs] the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern . . . and [I] don't understand
why some people are not concerned."). See Cade Metz, Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and the
Feud Over Killer Robots, N.Y. TuIEs, June 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/
technology/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-artificial-intelligence.html; Rory Cellan-Jones, Ste-
phen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind, BBC, Dec. 2, 2014, https://
www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540; Pete Holley, Bill Gates on Dangers of Artificial
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DeLong & Marshall Steinbaum ed. 2017); FORD, supra note 84.
217 See Estlund, supra note 87, at 254 ("This Article charts a path for reforming that body
of law [that is, employment law] in the face of justified anxiety and uncertainty about he
future impact of automation on jobs.").
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ment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. Comp. L. 581, 581 (2006); Lesley
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The precautionary critique would take issue with the claim in this Arti-
cle that artificial intelligence's limited capacity today suggests that its pri-
mary harms will stem from human error and its capacity to exacerbate this
error. It would assert that this is a short-sighted view that fails to take into
account foreseeable and near-term improvements in the technology. As a
result, artificial financial intelligence presents a much greater risk to our fi-
nancial system, and one that requires significant new regulatory initiatives
and structures.
This Article concedes that if we believe that artificial intelligence will
soon, or even eventually, lead to superhuman computers that will eliminate
vast swathes of the work force or, as Elon Musk fears, swarms of killer
robots, then we would need much more far-reaching reforms, both in law
and society. Thus, to a certain extent, the arguments in this Article presup-
pose that the most extreme predictions about artificial intelligence are im-
plausible. At the same time, if artificial intelligence does evolve to this
super-state, our worries will be about much more than financial regulation.
But more importantly, the precautionary critique is itself susceptible to
important criticism. If we adopted a strong precautionary approach, we
might well end up stifling innovation by ratcheting up the costs of techno-
logical adoption.219 It might also be a waste of regulatory resources-if we
end up regulating something that never comes about, or that evolves in such
a way that the regulation is ill-adapted to it, then we will have displaced
useful, near-term regulatory action with useless, long-term action.220 A wait-
and-see approach can be a prudent regulatory strategy if it allows industry
participants, government bodies, and the public to gather more information
about the costs and benefits of the technology, or let the technology mature
into a more stable equilibrium.221 In the case of artificial financial. intelli-
gence, where financial institutions are still experimenting and learning, regu-
219 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & A.
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2125 (2013);
Anthony Falzone, Regulation and Technology, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 105 (2013).
220 See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV.
565 (2014); John P. Dwyer, Overregulation, 15 ECOLOGY L. Q. 719 (1988).
221 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Paul G. Mahoney, The Pernicious Art of Securities
Regulation, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 1373 (1999); Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUSTON L.
REV. 77 (2003); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012). But see Jonathan
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncer-
tainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Michael D.
Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and
Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 (2011);
Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L. J. 359 (2009).
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lators would be ill-advised to launch a wholesale restructuring of their
regulation around a still-inchoate algorithm.222
C. The Balance Critique
If Al cynics say that artificial intelligence is nothing new, and Al pessi-
mists say that artificial intelligence is a dire threat, Al optimists have a dif-
ferent view.223 While acknowledging that artificial intelligence has risks,
they assert that these risks are more than outweighed by the benefits.224
Moreover, there are also risks to not adopting artificial intelligence. On bal-
ance, the benefits of incorporating artificial intelligence into business greatly
exceed the costs. Thus, to proponents of this balance critique, rather than
simply defaulting to an anti-technology position (like the Al pessimists do),
we need to carefully balance the pros and cons, and we will find that the
pros of encouraging the growth of artificial intelligence exceed the cons of
doing so.
Again, this Article largely agrees with the substance of the balance cri-
tique. When regulating a technology, we need to take into account both the
costs of the technology and the benefits of it.225 As these critics rightfully
point out, there are harms from not adopting artificial intelligence strategies
if they can play a useful role in reducing fraud or increasing the efficiency of
capital markets.226 Companies are likely better judges of this than govern-
222 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100
MrNN. L. REv. 1441, 1444 (2016) ("In thinking about regulating a dynamically changing fi-
nancial system, it may be more effective-or at least instructive-to focus on the system's
underlying, and thus less time-dependent, economic functions than to tie regulation to any
specific financial architecture.").
223 See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 187, at 1223 ("For administrative agencies,
what will distinguish the machine-learning era is not a substitution of human judgment with
some foreign and unfamiliar methodology, but rather an evolution of human judgment to in-
corporate fundamentally similar-albeit more accurate and often practically more useful-
processes of decision making made possible by advances in statistical knowledge, data stor-
age, and digital computing. The analysis offered here provides an antidote to visceral reactions
against the use of artificial intelligence in the public sector, reactions we hope will give way to
a measured optimism capable of guiding and improving the future of the administrative
state."); Steve Lohr Another Use for A.I: Finding Millions of Unregistered Voters, N.Y.
TiMsS, Nov. 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/technology/unregistered-voter-
rolls.html; Angus Loten, AI Tool Helps Companies Detect Expense Account Fraud, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-tool-helps-companies-detect-expense-ac-
count-fraud-11551175200.
224 See Vikram Mahidhar & Thomas H. Davenport, Why Companies That Wait to Adopt AI
May Never Catch Up, HARV. Bus. REv., Dec. 6, 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/12/why-compa-
nies-that-wait-to-adopt-ai-may-never-catch-up.
225 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTs. REGULATION, A BALANCED APPROACH TO COST-BENE-
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tors, 9 J. L. EcoN. & POL Y 569 (2013). For a discussion of the difficulties of conducting such
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26 See, e.g., Shani R. Else & Francis G.X. Pileggi, Corporate Directors Must Consider
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ment officials, given their direct involvement and their indirect financial in-
centives. Too often, the default view of regulators is that companies should
bear the burden of proof to show that the benefits of their innovations exceed
the costs.227 This may be good politics, but it is bad policy.
At the same time, it is the duty of financial regulators to uphold free,
fair, and stable markets. This Article has identified several ways in which
artificial financial intelligence might undermine these pillars of financial
regulation, and thus regulators should be vigilant about the risks. More im-
portantly, by identifying the risks and discussing ways to reduce them, we
can shift the balance of benefits and harms, making artificial financial intelli-
gence more socially useful and less socially damaging. Presumably this is a
goal that all groups can support.
So we have rejected the mirror critique, the precautionary critique, and
the balance critique, and, in the process, rejected the cynics, the pessimists,
and the optimists. Where does that leave us? I would say with moderation.
The most radical opinions often receive the most attention today, but this
does not mean that they are the most accurate. This Article, at its core, as-
serts that artificial financial intelligence is important, it is new, and it is
changing finance, but also that we are well-prepared to deal with it. We have
a comprehensive body of laws and regulations attuned to dealing with new
risks to the financial system, and our regulators are properly equipped to
respond to the challenges of artificial intelligence. To be sure, they may need
to adopt new regulatory tools or gain expertise in new areas of finance. But
this is always the case with new financial technologies.228
CONCLUSION
In the final chapter of Tell the Machine Goodnight, in a chance encoun-
ter on a train, Pearl runs into the man she had met earlier in the book, whom
the Apricity machine had told to amputate a finger. Pearl sees that the man is
indeed missing his index finger. She approaches and asks him how he is
doing. He replies, "Oh, good. You know. Getting along. As one does." The
reader is left in a state of uncertainty. Was the computer right? Was he hap-
pier as a result of taking its recommendation? Would he have been better off
keeping his finger intact? The reader simply does not know. But the story
gets at a deeper truth about artificial intelligence: thinking about artificial
intelligence is an exercise in imagination. It requires understanding how the
technology works and how it is currently being used, but it also requires us
2019, https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/02/corporate-directors-must-consider-impact-artifi-
cial-intelligence-effective-corporate-governance/.
227 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 225, at 9.
228 See William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (2018).
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to imagine how it might work in the future, and to what new uses it might be
put. While artificial intelligence is coming for finance, and, to a certain ex-
tent, has already arrived, its applications, for now, are limited and experi-
mental. Its risks derive primarily from the failure of human, not machine,
intelligence. We would do best to keep that in mind.
